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Nobody likes to be talked about but everybody likes to talk.
Trying to stop the dissemination of private information is, however, an
impingement on free expression and the freedom to observe. A
freestanding "right of privacy" that violates these interests is
constitutionally permissible only if it can be justified using one of the
standard bases for allowing restrictions on First Amendment rights. The
three most likely possibilities are that the law in question: (1) can pass
strict scrutiny, (2) falls within a recognized "categorical" exception, or
(3) places only an "incidental" burden on First Amendment interests. Of
these three, only the last would seem to support a broad protection for
privacy in the face of a First Amendment challenge and, indeed, such
protection has long been provided under the ordinary law of property.
The exclusivity provided by ordinary property rights has long protected
privacy in the places where most people spend most of their time, viz.
privately owned spaces, and with respect to the objects that hold our
personal information, including papers, digital equipment, and other such
privately-owned chattels.
To the extent that privacy interests can be protected through
ordinary property law (as most can), they should not encounter the
serious constitutional objections that can be raised against laws that
directly impinge on First Amendment interests. Any burdens on First
Amendment interests imposed by property laws would qualify as merely
"incidental" burdens, since the law of property (unlike many "privacy"
laws) does not exist for the very purpose of limiting First Amendment
interests such as the interest in free dissemination of truthful information.
By contrast, rights of privacy that are divorced from property rights
typically are meant to operate as direct impingements on the exercise of
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First Amendment rights and they are, therefore, of dubious constitutional
validity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Last spring someone in suburban New York circulated a "Smut
List" purportedly naming nearly 100 sexually-active high school girls.
The list, which appeared on Facebook and quickly attracted thousands of
"likes," caused outrage among school officials, who denounced it as a
"reprehensible act of cyber-bullying."2 The local police chief promised
"to prosecute to the fullest extent of the law." 3
Meanwhile, criminal charges were pending in New Jersey
against Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei for collecting and transmitting video
images of Tyler Clementi as he engaged in intimate conduct with another
young man.4 The conduct occurred in the college dorm room that Ravi
and Clementi shared. The video was captured by a built-in camera on
Ravi's laptop, which he had left in the room.6 Tragically, Clementi
committed suicide a few days after Ravi and Wei exposed his liaison.7
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law School. B.A. University of
Miami, J.D. Ohio State University. I wish to thank research assistants Ryan Galler,
Malory Goldstein and Steven Kuza for their valuable assistance.
1. Randi Weiner, Area Schools Not Taking Internet 'Smut List' as a Joke, THE
JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester, NY), Mar. 19, 2011, at 3A, available at 2011 WLNR
5433566; see also Andrew Klappholz, 'Smut List' an Example of New Age of
Cyberbullying Among Teens, THE JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester, NY), Mar. 23,
2011, at lA, available at 2011 WLNR 5738186.
2. Weiner, supra note 1.
3. Klappholz, supra note 1.
4. See Tamer El-Ghobashy, Suicide Follows a Secret Webcast, WALL ST. J.
(Sep. 30, 2010), at A27, available at Proquest, Proquest Document ID 755920686;
Richard Prez-Pefia, More Complex Picture Emerges in Rutgers Student's Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A17. Reportedly, Wei has accepted an arrangement
under which the charges against her may eventually be dismissed in exchange for,
among other things, her testimony against Ravi. See Aman Ali, Plea Deal Means
Student to Testify Against Rutgers Roommate, REUTERS, (May 6, 2011, 12:58 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/06/us-rutgers-suicide-
idUSTRE7454JS20110506. It is not clear what deficiencies the prosecutors see in
the case against Ravi that have led them to offer leniency to his co-defendant.
5. See Prez-Pefia, supra note 4.
6. Yamiche Alcindor, Lesson of Rutgers Case: Online Actions Carry
Consequences, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2012, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-16/rutgers/53574554/1.
7. See Prez-Pefia, supra note 4. Apparently, Clementi's sexual orientation was
already generally known. See id. (stating that Clementi was "worried about his
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In each of these cases, the dissemination of private information
was outrageous and highly offensive; but outrageousness and
offensiveness are not valid reasons for suppressing speech under the First
8Amendment. In each case, too, the dissemination revealed information
about people without their consent. But most important communications
protected by the right of free expression consist of information about
people, their lives and doings, and consent is rarely obtained. Cases like
these raise the question: To what extent may government constitutionally
prohibit people from disseminating truthful information about other
people without their consent?
It is easy to say that the information Ravi and Wei so brutally
revealed was none of their business and that it was none of the business
of the people to whom they revealed it. The same can be said of the
information on the "Smut List." People's sex lives are usually viewed as
private. But can we generalize from the particularized facts of cases such
as these to a constitutional principle?
Suppose a mother remarks to a neighbor that her fourteen-year-
old daughter is starting to spend a lot of time with an older classmate
named Robby, and the neighbor happens to have heard from her own
daughter that "everybody says" Robby is, to put it diplomatically, very
sexually active. The mother of the fourteen-year-old may or may not
think that a sexually active boyfriend is "right" for her child, but let's
suppose she does not. Would we say that this information is none of the
business of either mother? Should the neighbor who passes on the
information about Robby be prosecuted "to the fullest extent of the
law"? More generally, is information about the sex lives of high school
mother's acceptance of his orientation, but was not particularly concerned about who
else knew").
8. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _ ,131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56
(1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.726, 745-46 (1978) ("[T]he fact that
society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.
Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason
for according it constitutional protection."). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
9. Klappholz, supra note 1. The hypothetical in the text implies that the
neighbor's motivation is different from that of the "Smut List" authors but, after all,
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students, such as the information on the "Smut List," of legitimate
interest to parents and classmates who might avoid harm by being aware
of it?'0 Issues like these are not easy to resolve in the abstract and that is,
no doubt, one of the reasons why it is a fundamental presupposition of
the First Amendment that no organ of government is qualified to decide
for us what is important for us to know."
Unfortunately, people often do things they are not proud of or do
not want others to know about. Often, however, these are precisely the
even the malicious may have valuable information and, indeed, an urge to strike a
blow at the contemptible conduct of others may be among the most common
motivators of socially valuable expos6s. It is doubtful that, in general,
whistleblowers risk their livelihoods and futures out of pure public spirit, but their
disclosures are no less valuable, in First Amendment terms, merely because they are
prompted by anger or hate.
10. The risks in dating sexually active classmates, of either sex, are not entirely
fanciful. For example, according to researchers at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, "at least one in 4 American girls has a sexually transmitted disease."
1 in 4 Teen Girls has Sexually Transmitted Disease, NBCNEWS.COM, (Mar. 11,
2008, 12:32 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23574940/ns/health-
kids andparenting/t/teen-girls-has-sexually-transmitted-disease/. See also Sara E.
Forhan, Sami L. Gottlieb et al., Prevalence of Sexually Transmitted Infections
Among Female Adolescents Aged 14 to 19 in the United States, 124 PEDIATRICS
1505 (2009).
11. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. , , 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672
(2011) ("Some ... ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the
value of the information presented."); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
784-85 (1978) ("In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the
speakers who may address a public issue."). The First Amendment "presupposes that
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). In a somewhat different context, one of the reasons
the Supreme Court rejected the "public interest" criterion for requiring a showing of
actual malice in defamation cases is that it would force judges "to determine ... 'what
information is relevant to self-govemment."' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971)
(Marshall, J. dissenting)). Justice Thurgood Marshall also noted that "all human
events are arguably within the area of 'public or general concern."' Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 79. See also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) ("[W]e have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish
politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.").
things that others want or need to know. Each of us, for our own
protection and well-being, is better off being aware of the negative or
less-than-flattering qualities of the people with whom we deal and of the
activities-sexual and otherwise-that may evidence character. Parents
want to know about the people who interact with their children, business
people want to know about their business counterparts, people in dating
relationships want to know about their romantic partners, and so on.12
The value of such "daily life"' 3 information would, however, be
seriously compromised if dissemination were legally permitted only on a
need-to-know basis. For one thing, it is hard to know in advance exactly
which particular bits of personal information may later turn out to be
relevant or useful. Besides, a person should not have to wait until
actually in the danger zone before having a legitimate right to
information pertinent to well-being. Need-to-know limits on
dissemination of personal information can impair the information's
value, and therefore there is good reason to think that government should
not be in the business of suppressing any truthful information that people
have learned about each other. Because such information is potentially
relevant and useful, the question arises whether it can be consistent with
good legal policy, not to mention the constitutional protection of speech,
to make the dissemination of truthful personal information punishable-a
risky activity that one does at one's peril. Should the disclosures that
people make about other people without the latters' consent be subject to
after-the-fact governmental determinations that the disclosures were not
justified, unnecessary, or even that they were a crime?' 4
12. Notably, perhaps, there may be no general "public" interest in these kinds
of "daily life matters," as Professor Eugene Volokh dubbed them in his excellent
analysis. But, for most people, most of the time, conversational topics like these are
the ones that really count-the ones that supply the information that people need
most. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy and the
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1092-95 (2000); see also infra notes 175-201 and
accompanying text.
13. Volokh, supra note 12, at 1092-99.
14. It should be stressed that the discussion in this Article is focused on
truthful disclosures and the conflict that exists between the right of privacy and First
Amendment interests. Obviously, very different concerns are raised by
disseminations of false information, as in defamation. See generally authorities cited
infra notes 182 & 190.
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The basis for prosecuting Ravi and Wei was title 2C, chapter 14
of the New Jersey Statutes.' 5 This statute prohibits making or disclosing
a recording or other reproduction of an image of another person "whose
intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual
penetration or sexual contact." 6 This statute is a content-based
regulation of expression because it prohibits disclosures involving only
certain kinds of content (intimate exposure, sexual penetration, or sexual
contact). Regulations that discriminate based on content are normally
invalid, unless they can pass strict scrutiny. 17 The strict-scrutiny standard
requires that a content-based regulation "be narrowly tailored to promote
15. See Prez-Pefla, supra note 4.
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (b) & (c) (West 2010). The statute states in
relevant part:
b. An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing
that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he
photographs, films, videotapes, records, or otherwise
reproduces in any manner, the image of another person
whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an
act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that
person's consent and under circumstances in which a
reasonable person would not expect to be observed.
c. An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing
that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses
any photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other
reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate
parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual
penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has
consented to such disclosure. For purposes of this
subsection, "disclose" means sell, manufacture, give,
provide, lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish,
distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise
or offer.
Id. § 2C:14-9 (b) & (c). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2010) (video voyeurism).
17. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2738 (2011); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid. . . ."). See also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, ,
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (.'[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content."') (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573
(2002)).
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a compelling Government interest," and there must not be a "less
restrictive alternative [that] would serve the Government's purpose."' 8
Whether New Jersey's sex-focused statute serves a "compelling"
governmental interest, or whether a similar statute could be crafted to
serve such an interest, appears questionable at present.19 Sex-focused
statutes like the one in New Jersey are, however, by no means the only
kinds of privacy laws that discriminate on the basis of content. On the
contrary, it seems to be part of the inherent nature of the "invasion of
privacy" tort to impose content-based restrictions on expression. For
example, according to the Second Restatement of Torts, an actionable
invasion of privacy consists of giving "publicity" to "a matter concerning
the private life of another." 20 As so defined, the "invasion of privacy"
18. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813-15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The
"strict scrutiny" standard applies even if the material in question is sexually-themed
material. See id. Although there is a categorical exception to the First Amendment
for regulations of obscenity, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-84 (1957),
the New Jersey statute does not even purport to limit its prohibition to the sort of
"specifically defined" sexual conduct that meets the Supreme Court's restrictive test
for constitutionally regulable "obscenity." See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-
24 (1973).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 42-80. One factor that may have made
the disclosures in the Ravi-Wei case so painful for Clementi is the fact that there is
still invidious discrimination against persons who are gay. See Anita L. Allen,
Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CAL. L. REv. 1711,
1716 (2010). In view of that discrimination, it would be wrong to understate the
interest that some "LGBT plaintiffs understandably assert in . . . 'selective
disclosure' of their sexual orientations or identities." See id. Apart from the First
Amendment concerns discussed here, however, the tort of invasion of privacy has
proved unreliable in supporting the interest in selective disclosure. Id at 1746-50.
But even if the courts were entirely supportive, it does not seem likely that the
possibility of civil lawsuits would actually stop people from talking about one
another's sexual interests, meaning that keeping such disclosures "selective" is
probably not a realistic goal in any case. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that,
as long as people invidiously discriminate, government has an interest in forbidding
dissemination of information they can use in doing so. Whether the governmental
interest in suppressing truthful information to such an end would be sufficiently
compelling to pass First Amendment muster is an open question.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.").
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tort is plainly a content-based regulation of expression since it selectively
imposes restrictions on speech concerning a single class of subject matter
(information about others' private lives). 2' This does not mean, of course,
that all such privacy laws are necessarily invalid; but it does mean that a
basis needs to be specified for exempting them from the Constitution's
protection of free expression.22
In addition to the possibility of passing the strict-scrutiny
standard, there are at least two other recognized exceptions to First
Amendment protection that might, depending on the circumstances,
serve as a basis for upholding laws that seek to protect private
23information by suppressing free expression. The second possibility is
that a law restricting privacy-invasive speech falls within one of the
21. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). That is to say, the restriction's
"justification focuses only on the content of the speech" and its effect on listeners.
Id. See also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994) ("Our cases have
recognized that even a regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its
manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys.").
22. The Second Restatement explicitly recognizes this need with its
constitutional caveat:
The case of Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S.
469, . . . leaves open the question of whether liability can
constitutionally be imposed for other private facts that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that are not of
legitimate concern. Pending further elucidation by the
Supreme Court, this Section has been drafted in accordance
with the current state of the common law of privacy and the
constitutional restrictions on that law that have been
recognized as applying.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (Special Note).
23. The protections of the First Amendment reach wide, but they are not
absolute. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) ("At the
outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association . . . are 'absolutes,' .
. . in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal
reading of the First Amendment."). See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-
59 (2003) (true threats); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1986) (subject
to "incidental" burdens); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (recognizing
rule); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-84 (1957) (categorical exception for
obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (categorical
exception for fighting words).
"categorical exceptions" to First Amendment protection,2 such as the
exception for speech that is "integral to criminal conduct."25 A third
possibility is that the law in question imposes a burden on speech that is
merely incidental to furthering a valid legislative purpose unrelated to
suppressing free expression.26 The three standard exceptions to First
Amendment protection do not exhaust the possibilities, but they seem to
be the most promising bases for upholding laws that restrict free
expression for the sake of privacy.
The next part of this Article, Part II, will briefly review the
tension between privacy interests and free expression, noting the very
significant constitutional difference between the two. In Parts III through
V, the possibilities of upholding privacy laws will be considered in light
of the three most promising standard exceptions to First Amendment
protection (laws that pass strict scrutiny, laws that restrict speech integral
to illegal conduct, and laws that impose a merely "incidental" burden on
speech). Part V will also discuss how most of the interests generally
thought of as "privacy interests," in both information and seclusion, have
been, and can continue to be, protected by the normal operation of
ordinary property laws, which impose only incidental burdens on speech
and which create rights that are, in themselves, entitled to the protection
of an enumerated constitutional right.
There are, it should be noted, two related topics that the
discussion in this Article does not concern. First, this Article is not
24. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584-86 (2010);
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19-20; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. Incidental burdens on speech that result from otherwise valid laws do not
have to satisfy strict scrutiny. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. For further discussion,
see infra Part V. In addition to the three possibilities to be discussed here, there are
at least two other conceivable bases for upholding regulations of First Amendment
freedoms in the interest of privacy. Most importantly, perhaps, is the exception for
restrictions on the "time, place, or manner" of speech. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481
(1988). Another, less plausible possibility is the exception for restrictions on speech
that aim only to control certain "secondary effects" of the expression. See, e.g.,
Renton v Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). It is believed, however, that the
three possibilities mentioned in the text are the only ones that might have such broad
applicability to uphold laws that aim specifically at protecting the privacy of
personal information.
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concerned with defamatory false statements or communications.
Defamation is, of course, the subject of a specific categorical exclusion
from First Amendment protection,27 and that exclusion gives lawmakers
28
appreciably greater flexibility in regulating defamatory content.
Second, this Article is not concerned with the extent to which
government is required to respect privacy interests in carrying out its
own governmental functions (for example, complying with the Fourth
29Amendment). Instead, the focus will be on the constitutional limits on
government's power to confer private individuals with privacy rights that
30limit the First Amendment liberties of other private persons.
II. PRIVACY VS. FREE EXPRESSION
The interests in privacy and in free expression are both
important,3 but they are in fundamental tension with one another. For
27. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (discussing
group defamation). See also Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (citing Beauharnais as,
apparently, still good law on, at least, broad points); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-
572.
28. This Article also does not discuss the limits, still ill-defined, on the
governmental power to ban non-defamatory falsehoods, such as portraying other
persons in a false light. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). For a
further discussion, see generally Nat Stem, Implications Of Libel Doctrine For
Nondefamatory Falsehoods Under The First Amendment, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
465 (2012).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). Cf infra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text.
30. Thus, for example, the extent to which government may choose to
withhold or disclose private information in its possession is not a topic of this
Article. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (upholding statute limiting rap sheet disclosure); Paul v.
David, 424 U.S. 693, 694 (1978); Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals
in the Hands of Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455 (1995); Elaine M.
Chiu, That Guy's A Batterer!: A Scarlet Letter Approach To Domestic Violence in
the Information Age, 44 FAM, L.Q. 255 (2010).
31. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) ("[P]ress
freedom and privacy rights are both 'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant
26 [Vol. 11I
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most of us, the character, qualities, propensities, and conduct of those
who live around us are matters of great interest. At the same time,
however, most people want to keep at least some aspects of their lives
out of the view and knowledge of others. Despite the nearly universal
practice of discussing the doings and personal characteristics of other
people, there likewise seems to be a nearly universal drive to remain, at
least in some respects, private. Nobody likes to be talked about, but
everybody likes to talk.
The fact cannot be avoided that, at bottom, a right of
"information privacy," such as the one described in Restatement §
652D,3 2 is at its core a right to not be talked about-a direct restriction on
free expression. Due to this close, "zero-sum" relationship between
privacy and free expression, conflicts between them are inevitable. There
is, however, a very basic legal distinction between the interest in free
expression and the interest in privacy, namely, the interest in free
expression is protected by the Constitution whereas the privacy interest,
except against government, is not.33 As against other private persons, the
concerns of our society. . . .'). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518
(2001) (describing "the interest in the full and free dissemination of information
concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy"
as "interests of the highest order"). While Bartinicki spoke of the "interest in
individual privacy," it should be stressed that what the Court explicitly had in mind
was not the general right of privacy, but "more specifically, [the interest] in fostering
private speech." Id. at 518. Thus, for Barnicki, the privacy interest "of the highest
order" was the one that supported, not restricted, free speech. Id.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977), supra note 20. In
addition to the right of "information privacy" described in § 652D, there is a
complementary privacy right of "seclusion," described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652B (1977), infra note 91.
33. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) ("[T]he protection
of a person's general right to privacy - his right to be let alone by other people - is,
like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States."). In discussing the "constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy,"'
the Court has recognized that "[t]he cases sometimes characterized as protecting
'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests," viz. "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and "the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). However, all of the examples that the Court gave in
Whalen seem to involve the privacy right as against government. Id. at 599 n.24, 600
n.26. The Court did not give the slightest hint that the constitutional right of privacy
would, in any of its facets, protect the individual's privacy interest as against other
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right to remain obscure in our lives and activities is protected only by
ordinary laws, mostly state statutes and common law.3 4
This fundamental legal difference between the interests in free
expression and in privacy is, of course, highly important. Whenever the
two interests collide, as they frequently do, there is an inevitable question
of priority. However, by enshrining the protection of free expression in
the Constitution and not doing the same for privacy, except as against
government, the Framers appear to have settled the priority between the
two.3 5 The enumerated protection of speech and press in the First
Amendment is a clear statement of the Framers' judgment that free
expression is meant to trump competing non-constitutional interests,
which would include the interest in privacy. As the Supreme Court has
noted:
The very enumeration of the right takes out of the
hands of government-even the Third Branch of
Government-the power to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject
to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no
constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights
are enshrined with the scope they were understood
private individuals. See generally id. and particularly at n.24. Even against
government, the constitutional right of privacy, outside the search-and-seizure
context, is extremely limited. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66
(1973) ("Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment included 'only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' . . . This privacy right
encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
motherhood, procreation, and child rearing.") (citations omitted). Although Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(gay sex), clarify and amplify the list in Paris Adult Theatre, they do not add any
distinctly different items to it.
For a good synopsis of the Supreme Court's decisions declining to find a
constitutional protection for information privacy, see Chiu, supra note 30, at 282-89.
34. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530 (using the term "state-protected
privacy interests").
35. Cf., e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)
(affirming, in relation to privacy, "that the State's policy must be subordinated to" a
constitutional right, and the "constitutional right must prevail over the state's
interest").
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to have when the people adopted them, whether or
not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges
36think that scope too broad.
The enumeration of a right, in other words, elevates the right "above all
other interests,"3  and any later determination that the enumerated right is
outweighed by other interests should be quite extraordinary, if not off the
table entirely.38 Some earlier statements by members of the Court suggest
the possibility that ordinary privacy interests might be balanced against
free expression, 39 but the Court has since declared "startling and
dangerous" the notion that deciding whether "a given category of speech
enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing
of the value of the speech against its societal costs." 40 The Framers'
constitutional choice means there is not supposed to be an ongoing,
more-or-less neutral balancing of First Amendment interests against
mere "state-protected privacy interests."4 1
Thus, the interests in free expression and in privacy are not to be
regarded as "competing constitutional concerns."42 While the interest in
free expression may itself justify a degree of privacy protection in order
36. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008). Though the
Supreme Court made the quoted statement in reference to the Second Amendment,
the Court left no doubt that it applies equally to the First. Id. at 635. ("Like the First,
[the Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people,"
which the courts should not conduct anew.).
37. Id.
38. Id at 636.
39. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 547 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
concern for a free press is appropriate, but such concerns should be balanced against
rival interests in a civilized and humane society."). The term "ordinary" is used here
in contradistinction to privacy interests that are specifically in the interest of
"fostering private speech." See supra note 31.
40. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010)
(quoting Brief for the United States at 8).
41. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530 (majority opinion); see also Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) ("[I]n public debate [we]
must tolerate insulting and even outrageous speech in order to provide adequate
'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.") (quoting
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). Cf supra note 31.
42. To borrow the words, though perhaps not the meaning, of Justice Stephen
Breyer in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536-37 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
to further the "interest . . . in fostering private speech," 43 to go further
and talk of a "competing" constitutional privacy right, independent of
fostering free expression, is to go beyond the authorities: "The First
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the
basis that some speech is not worth it." 4 4
In sum, the laws that protect private information and the
Constitution's protection of free expression both serve important societal
concerns, but the two are in fundamental conflict. The law can protect
private information only at the expense of others' expressive liberty.
When conflicts arise, the protection of free expression has clear
constitutional priority. The interest in free expression is protected by an
enumerated constitutional right, but the interest in privacy is not.45 The
Framers' determination of priority reflected in that enumeration is
neither open to legislative revision nor to a general balancing of interests
in which privacy ranks as the equal of expression.
III. CAN PRIVACY LAWS PASS STRICT SCRUTINY?
When a law discriminates on the basis of content, such as by
singling out speech "concerning the private life of another," 4 6 it is
presumptively unconstitutional. 47 Nonetheless, content-based restrictions
on speech can still be upheld as long as they survive strict scrutiny.48 In
order to pass strict scrutiny, the law must first and foremost be "justified
by a compelling Government interest,"49 and the burden is on the state to
43. Id. at 518 (majority opinion); see also id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
44. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
45. Except, again, as against government. See supra note 31.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
47. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) ("When
the Government seeks to restrict speech based on its content, the usual presumption
of constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is reversed."); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid.").
48. See supra text accompanying note 18.
49. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. , , 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2738 (2011) (emphasis added); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 385.
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show that a compelling interest exists.o This burden on the state is,
moreover, "not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction . .. must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree." 5' As the Supreme Court has recently
stated: "The State must specifically identify an 'actual problem' in need
of solving . . . and the curtailment of free speech must be actually
necessary to the solution." 5 2
Because privacy laws come in many varieties and take many
forms, the question of whether they can survive strict scrutiny is not one
that can be answered in the abstract. Each law and application has to be
considered on its own to determine whether the interest in keeping the
particular information secret is a compelling governmental interest, and
this determination would presumably depend, at least in part, on the
content of the information in question.
To take an obvious example, preserving secrecy would be a
compelling interest in cases where disclosures would threaten national
security.53 Another such example would be situations in which
50. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738-39. The burden is on the state because "content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid." R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382. See also
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817; Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 416
(1993) (where city failed to show reasonable fit between its regulation and a its
alleged interest, the Court struck down the city's ban on news racks containing
commercial handbills on public property); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) ("[1]t is common to place the burden upon the
Government to justify impingements on First Amendment interests.").
51. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). The Edenfield case
specifically concerned commercial speech, which is subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Presumably the "strict" standards for non-commercial speech are as high or even
higher. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("To require
a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First
Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a
limited measure of protection . . . .").
52. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (citation omitted).
53. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that the First
Amendment would not protect the "publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops"). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (disallowing prior restraint in the "Pentagon Papers" case).
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information has to be suppressed in order to permit a fair trial, which, of
course, the state and federal governments are constitutionally obliged to
provide.54 In both of these kinds of cases, the expressive interest is
countervailed by interests that are rather obviously weighty in
themselves and are also subjects of constitutional prioritization. Still
other situations of compelling interest may arise (for example, to prevent
imminent death and destruction)55 but, as the Supreme Court has recently
cautioned, "[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its
content will ever be permissible." The question is whether laws that
regulate speech for the purpose of protecting a freestanding right57 of
personal privacy would ever be among them.
As a threshold matter, it seems safe to say that government could
have a constitutionally compelling interest in protecting individual
privacy only where there is, at a minimum, a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Indeed, it seems unlikely that government could have much
interest at all in protecting unreasonable expectations, much less that
such protection would entail the "high degree of necessity" required to
justify impingements on First Amendment liberties.
The concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" is most often
associated with the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. 59 While
Fourth Amendment cases on what constitutes "reasonable" expectations
54. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) ("Few, if
any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair
trial by 'impartial' jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would
violate that fundamental right.").
55. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (incitement).
While, strictly speaking, the Brandenburg rule applies only to cases of "imminent
lawless action," presumably any action that threatens imminent death and
destruction could fall within its ambit as long as government has a compelling
interest in preventing it. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
56. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp.,
529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
57. That is to say, a right of privacy that is, in the original words of the
Restatement, "not dependent upon conduct which, aside from the invasion of
privacy, would be tortious, such as trespass to land or chattels, or defamation."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. d (1939).
58. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable searches and seizures). See, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988) (upholding warrantless search
of garbage put out for collection).
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of privacy may not be conclusive for First Amendment purposes, 60it
seems plausible to treat those cases as being at least evidence of which
privacy expectations are and are not reasonable.61 This is because the
Fourth Amendment conceptions of "reasonable" expectations are based,
at least ostensibly, on the understandings about privacy possessed by
"society as a whole."62 Under the Supreme Court's reading of those
understandings, a person is deemed to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy only with respect to "what he seeks to preserve as private."6 3 A
person does not, for instance, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
60. Arguably, the courts should not allow the Fourth Amendment cases to
define the outer limits of "reasonable" expectations of privacy for other purposes
because, notably, many Fourth Amendment cases seem to have relied on the
"understandings of society as a whole" standard in an apparent effort to give freer
reign to law enforcement. For example, the Supreme Court's "open fields" doctrine,
which, in denying privacy expectations for fenced, secured open areas, seems to
have ignored genuine expectations of privacy. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984). Some of the state cases are even more startlingly at variance with
probable public understandings of privacy. See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy inside a
restroom stall); Moore v. State, 355 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978) (declaring that
the happenings in a restroom stall are "in plain view" because of the half-inch crack
between the stall door and its wall); accord State v. McClung, 1982 Ohio App.
LEXIS 14675 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). It is surprising to learn that "any member of the
public," Moore, 355 So. 2d at 1220, would be within his rights peering through the
cracks around the partitioning in restroom stalls, but there it is.
61. The courts and commentators have not, however, necessarily limited its
application to the Fourth Amendment context. See e.g., Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson
& Assocs., Civ.A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592 (Mass. Super. May 26, 1999);
Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs., 4 A. 3d 170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (1979) (discussing expectations of
an "ordinary reasonable man"). As discussed in the text that immediately follows,
the meaning of the concept for other purposes should not necessarily be limited by
the Fourth Amendment cases.
62. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40, 43 ("An expectation of privacy does not
give rise to Fourth Amendment protection . . . unless society is prepared to accept
that expectation as objectively reasonable.").
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Greenwood, 486
U.S. at 40-41.
what he "knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office . . . ."
Even if the courts should not let the Fourth Amendment cases
woodenly define the outer limits of "reasonable" expectations of privacy
for other purposes, the core appeal in those cases to "our societal
understanding"65 must surely be instructive. In light of the Supreme
Court's reading of that understanding, it seems to follow that government
has no compelling interest in protecting privacy with respect to
information or activities that people have knowingly made accessible to
the view of other people whom they have no right to control.
Even in cases where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists,
however, there are still several reasons why it may be inappropriate to
conclude that there is a compelling governmental interest for restricting
speech.
First, though the interest in privacy is undoubtedly an important
one, it is still open to question how much harm actually results when
privacy interests are violated by a non-consensual dissemination of
personal secrets. Commentators are far from a consensus on this point.
As important as personal privacy may be, normal invasion-of-privacy
harms are generally less momentous in kind and degree than the harms
that clearly do raise compelling interests, such as those that result from
invading other constitutional interests67 or, presumably, that involve or
threaten imminent death and destruction. It may be embarrassing,
humiliating or even economically disadvantageous to have people find
out the truth about you, but the harm is not likely to be seriously
debilitating (and certainly not likely to be fatal), at least not for people in
sound mental health.
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44
(1979) (holding that, under Katz, it would be unreasonable to expect a list of dialed
telephone number to remain private).
65. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
66. Compare Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967 (2003), with Heidi
Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No
Privacy in Public, 7 J.L. & POL. FOR INFO. Soc'Y 543 (2012); Quin S. Landon, Note,
The First Amendment and Speech Based Torts: Recalibrating the Balance, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 157 (2012). See also Chiu, supra note 30.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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Even when a non-consensual truthful disclosure results in
measurable economic harm, it cannot be forgotten that the harm consists,
in its essence, of being denied the benefit of a false reputation. Thus, if a
person with pedophiliac tastes in literature publicly revealed and, as a
result, is refused a job at a youth facility, he may incur significant
economic harm. But is that a harm government has a compelling interest
in preventing?69 The core problem with treating the interest in privacy as
a compelling interest is that it is the direct antithesis of the interest
everyone has in knowing the truth-the truth about qualities, character,
conduct, and propensities of those around us and, to put it bluntly, the
adverse ways in which they might affect us. The strength of the interest
in privacy is, in other words, at least somewhat offset by the strength of
the interest in knowing the truth about the people with whom we
interact.70
68. According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics special report, "[a]n estimated
12% of youth in state juvenile facilities and large non-state facilities . . . reported
experiencing one or more incidents of sexual victimization" in the previous 12
months, mostly committed by staff. ALLEN J. BECK, PAIGE M. HARRISON, & PAUL
GUERINO, Special Report, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES
REPORTED BY YOUTH, 2008-09 1 & 3 (Jan. 2010).
69. Recently, the actress Huong "Junie" Hoang brought suit against Amazon
for revealing her age, a revelation that she claimed tended to deprive her of
employment opportunities that, apparently, would have been available to her if
potential employers remained misinformed as to her true age. See Gene Johnson,
Actress Who Sued Amazon Over Age Ids Herself, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 6,2012, 9:37
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-207_162-57354341/actress-who-sued-amazon-
over-age-ids-herself.
70. None of this is to say, of course, that people should not have a First
Amendment right to try, by means of free expression, to define and shape the
contours of their own public personas. See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies And
The First Amendment's Protection Of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70
(2012). In this regard, I tend to agree with Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and Professor
David Han that such expression should come within the protection of the First
Amendment. See id.; United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673-74 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Kozinski, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc), aff'd, U.S. , 132
S.Ct. 2537 (2012). We all have complex personalities, a mix of aspects that are
lovable and of others that are not, and it would strike to the core of liberty and
autonomy for the law to regulate which aspects of ourselves we are allowed to stress,
to downplay, to distort or even to fabricate. To recognize and support this form of
self-defining expression decidedly does not, however, justify suppressing the
expression of other persons who might want to present additional or alternative
interpretations of an individual's personality. I discuss the latter issue at greater
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Closely related to these considerations is the futility argument;
that government cannot have a compelling interest in protecting false
reputations because they cannot really be protected anyway. At best, the
law can only postpone nearly inevitable future revelations. In this
respect, privacy laws are in sharp contrast with the laws against
defamation: If a law can stop a lie, it might be stopped forever, but if the
law stops the truth, the truth will still be there. A law that forbids
speaking the truth has little hope of long-term success because, as long as
the underlying truth exists, it will tend to spawn new statements that
reveal it. The only question is how many people will be hurt by the
falsehood before the truth comes out.7 1
Another reason to doubt that the interest secured by the right of
privacy is compelling is the very newness of the right compared with the
undoubted ancientness of the privacy interest.72 Could government really
have a compelling interest in creating a fundamental personality right
that no one had even heard of, as a freestanding right, until the late
1800s? Perhaps, but nonetheless the very newness of the freestanding
right of privacy is at least some indication that it protects little that the
law has not long protected anyway. Indeed, as will be described below,
length in my paper, John A. Humbach, Privacy Rights: The Virtue of Protecting a
False Reputation, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2071227.
71. To be sure, truth has its downsides. In this digital age, particularly, hurtful
truths such as criminal records are becoming virtually inescapable, creating a
permanent "semi-outlaw" class of economically and socially disadvantaged citizens.
See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption,
and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 How. L.J. 753, 754
(2011). For this reason, Ms. Love insists that we must make legal provision to
"acknowledge and forgive the crime rather than attempt to conceal and deny it." Id.
at 759.
72. The right of privacy in its modem understanding is usually traced to the
seminal 1890 article by Mr. Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis. Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). In
1938, the First Restatement of Torts included a section stating that "[a] person who
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1938). For a summary of the history of right
of privacy in its present Prosserian form, see Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus
Peifer, Prosser's Privacy and the German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy
Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF. L. REV., 1925, 1937-42 (2010).
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practically all reasonable expectations of privacy have long received
substantial legal protection as a by-product of property and
complementary contract-type rights, which, incidentally, further other
valid governmental interests and, therefore, do not need to be
"compelling." While the newness factor is not of course dispositive, it
does give additional reason for suspicion that, whatever interests are
uniquely protected by freestanding privacy rights, they are not, as such,
compelling.
Finally, there is the question of how the state could have a
"compelling" interest in protecting a purely private concern that, in
modern times, so many people seem to care little about and are so willing
to give up. With the advent of online social media sites and other
technological innovations, millions have opened up their lives to the
Internet, putting on display mountains of personal data and imagery, all
of which suggests that the general interest in privacy may not be as
strong as some make it out to be. Beyond that, people seem, on the
whole, to be willing to let government adopt unprecedented capacities
and policies to spy on the private lives of individuals, to see them
naked and grope them at airports, to break into their homes without
warrants,7 and to monitor their telephone conversations and Internet
activities.7 7 The ease with which the government eavesdrops on business
communications, as revealed at the recent Raj Rajaratnum trial, should
leave no one with the belief that ordinary business telephone calls are
78
reliably private. The point here is not whether such developments are
73. See infra Part V.
74. Incidental burdens on speech that result from otherwise valid laws do not
have to satisfy strict scrutiny. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 206-11.
75. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy
Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at Al.
76. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011)
(upholding a warrantless police break-in of a private home after smelling what was
thought to be marijuana).
77. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts: Secret Order to Widen Domestic Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2005, at Al.
78. According to the Electronic Privacy Freedom Center, during the
investigation of Raj Rajaratnum for insider trading:
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good or bad, but only that, as a matter of fact, there is practically no
political pushback as the sphere that the law considers "private" is
becoming narrower and narrower in scope. On the contrary, the bulk of
the public appears fully willing to accept a vast and growing range of
surveillance and intrusiveness, strong evidence that the interest in
privacy, though not completely pass6, is not ranked all that highly in the
larger balance of interests. It is not, in practice or the popular mind,
treated as anything like an interest whose protection carries the "high
79degree of necessity" that a compelling state interest requires.
In sum, few regulations of speech ever pass strict scrutiny.so
Restrictions on free expression solely in the interest of privacy are
unlikely to do so either.
The government intercepted over 18,000 telephone
conversations and communications involving more than 550
individuals from ten different telephones over a sixteen-month
period. While the SEC alleges that the communications reveal
Rajaratnam and other defendants' involvement in insider
trading, the wiretaps unquestionably also include private
communications. Some of the telephone calls consist of
conversations between Rajaratnam and his wife, his daughter,
other family members and his doctor.
Electronic Privacy Freedom Center, SEC v. Galleon Management, ELEC. PRIVACY
FREEDOM CTR., http://epic.org/amicus/secv galleon.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2012).
79. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. , _ 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741
(2011) (striking down restrictions on the sale of violent videogames to minors). The
trend toward practically unbridled government intrusion, at its discretion, into the
private lives of individuals is viewed by many, including myself, as lamentable. The
point is, however, that such enhanced intrusion seems largely acceptable both within
government as well as to the general public, leading one to doubt that there could be
a "compelling" interest in preserving actual privacy. At the same time, the
government's recent history of showing little respect for individual privacy provides,
one might think, good reason why it might be such a bad idea to enhance the role of
government in making new rules in this area.
80. Id. at 2738 ("It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its
content will ever be permissible.") (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp.,
529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
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IV. EXPRESSION INTEGRAL TO OTHERWISE UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
Although laws that discriminate on the basis of content are
normally subject to strict scrutiny, the strict-scrutiny standard does not
apply when restricted speech falls into one of the "well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech" to which First Amendment
protection does not extend. Examples of these "categorical exceptions"
to First Amendment protection include obscenity, defamation, fraud,
incitement, and "speech integral to criminal conduct."8 2 Of these, the
categorical exception for speech integral to criminal conduct-or, more
broadly, to unlawful conduct8-seems more likely than the others to
provide a plausible basis for upholding restrictions on free expression for
the sake of privacy. The Constitution does not prevent government from
banning disclosures of information by persons who commit criminal acts,
such as theft or illegal wiretapping, in order to get it.84 The underlying
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). But cf
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (stating that strict scrutiny may
nonetheless be required if the purpose of the content discrimination is unrelated to
the reason that the particular speech has been placed within the categorical
exception).
82. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010)
(citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). How, it
might be asked, can a law make conduct, such as trespass, unlawful and still be
constitutional if it impinges on First Amendment interests? The answer would seem
to be that the "integral" exception can only apply to restrictions on speech that can
meet the test for upholding "incidental" burdens on expression. The "incidental"
burdens test is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 26-30 & infra text
accompanying notes 212-18.
83. The principle behind the exception for "speech integral to criminal
conduct" plausibly extends as well to speech that is integral to any unlawful conduct
and, indeed, even to speech integral to conduct that is not, strictly speaking, unlawful
at all but that is nonetheless at odds with public policy. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1336 (2010)
(upholding ban on advice that promotes "misconduct designed to manipulate the
protections of the bankruptcy system"). While the Supreme Court has not yet
elaborated this rather obvious extension of "speech integral to criminal conduct," for
purposes of discussion, it will be assumed here that First Amendment protection
might plausibly be withheld from any speech integral to any otherwise unlawful
conduct.
84. "It would be frivolous to assert-and no one does in these cases-that the
First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on
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policy reason seems to be, logically, that protecting disclosures of
illegally obtained information would tend to incentivize the criminal
conduct in question. However, the problem with trying to rely on this
exception to protect privacy over a wide range is identifying
constitutionally valid crimes or unlawful conduct to which particular
privacy violations can be deemed "integral."
Consider, for example, the New Jersey statute under which Ravi
86
and Wei were charged. The same statute also contains a prohibition on
non-consensual recording of another person in specified sexual
circumstances.87 In addition, the statute even contains a prohibition on
merely observing another person in such circumstances without the
person's consent. These statutory prohibitions on recording and
observing present the possibility that the statute's prohibition on
dissemination could be upheld on the theory that the actions prohibited
are speech "integral" to the criminal conduct of illegal observing or
recording. As long as the prohibitions on recording and observing are
valid, information acquired in violation of those provisions would not
either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although
stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information,
neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever
the impact on the flow of news." Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 n.19 (2001)
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972)).
85. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982); see also Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990). For instance, the Supreme Court in New York
v. Ferber, supported a new categorical exception for child pornography by pointing
out that the market for such materials tended to promote the child abuse that is
required in order to create the material: "The advertising and selling of child
pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the
production of such materials. . . ." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (emphasis added). See
also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008). By contrast, child
pornography material that is created without the abuse of children (e.g., "virtual"
child pornography) cannot be constitutionally banned. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
86. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(a) (West 2010) ("An actor commits a crime of
the fourth degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, and under
circumstances in which a reasonable person would know that another may expose
intimate parts or may engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact, he observes
another person without that person's consent and under circumstances in which a
reasonable person would not expect to be observed.").
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come within the range of constitutionally protected expression.
Obviously, though, the soundness of this line of reasoning depends on
the key threshold question: Can government constitutionally make it a
crime to observe or record the actions of other people without their
consent?
A. The Fundamental Right to Observe
Historically, there has been but little impingement by the law,
criminal or otherwise, on the basic right to observe the world around us.
Very rarely has the law imposed obligations on individuals to avert their
eyes or stuff up their ears in order to avoid seeing or hearing other people
or observing their belongings.89 In the relatively few court decisions
involving the right to observe other people or their belongings, the courts
seem generally to recognize such a right.90 That situation could, however,
change with the stroke of a legislative pen enacting new laws to protect
"privacy." The question is whether there are constitutional limits on the
legislative power to enact laws that impinge on the right to observe?
89. One of the longstanding but rare examples would be the so-called "peeping
Tom" laws, which, for example, forbid a person to "peep secretly into a room
occupied by a female person." In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (N.C. 1978)
(quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (1932), which was one such example of a
"peeping Tom" law). See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the
Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1420-24 (2002). A more recent example
would be the expansive incarnations of so-called "wiretap" statutes, which are not at
all limited to actual wiretapping but also, for example, make it a serious felony
merely to overhear other peoples' conversations, with or without wires, under
various circumstances. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006) (applying to
utterances "by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation").
90. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (denying qualified
immunity for wrongful arrest of a citizen recording police activity in public); I.C.U.
Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 689-90 (Ala. 2000) (upholding the
right to observe happenings in front yard of home); Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson &
Assocs., Civ.A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592 (Mass. Super. May 26, 1999) (upholding
the right to observe happenings on the balcony of an apartment); Venzen v.
Abraham, 18 V.1. 385, 389 (1981) (concluding that a man photographed against his
will on the street had no right to privacy); see infra note 155 for additional cases.
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The right to observe and rights of privacy are crucially
interrelated. Laws to protect the privacy interest in "seclusion," such as
those described in the Second Restatement §652B 9 1 or the New Jersey
statute in the Ravi-Wei case,92 impose civil and criminal liability on
observation. In other words, the enforcement of these privacy laws is
necessarily at the direct expense of the right to observe. Just because the
rights to privacy and to observe are substantially conflicting, however,
does not mean that the interests they serve are constitutionally co-equal
or that, in balancing one against the other, they are entitled to equal
weight.
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court unanimously
declared that an individual has a "fundamental" right under the First
Amendment "to . . . observe what he pleases." 94 This holding was the
major premise of Stanley, and it was on this premise that the Court based
its other-and perhaps better remembered-conclusion, namely, that
there is a constitutional right to view obscenity in one's own home.95
Although Stanley's "obscenity-at-home" right may be the one
that is better remembered, the structure of the Stanley opinion leaves no
doubt that the obscenity right was not just plucked out of the air, but was
rather, based on the more general "fundamental" right to observe. This
basis is clear from the Court's line of reasoning, which first
acknowledged the fundamental right to observe as a general matter and
then, only after doing that, did it go on to recognize the much narrower
right to view obscenity at home. It was only after saying there is a
fundamental right to observe that the Court continued: "Moreover, in the
context of this case-a prosecution for mere possession of printed or
filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home-that right [to
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) ("One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
Although the section says "intrudes," the examples given in the comment all seem to
contemplate or presuppose that the intrusion includes observation.
92. See supra notes 16, 86-89 and accompanying text.
93. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
94. Id. at 568 ("Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of
individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the
administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.").
95. Id.
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observe] takes on an added dimension."9 6 Clearly, the Court saw the
right to view obscenity in the home as rooted in a right that is far broader
and more fundamental, namely, the right of the individual to "observe
what he pleases."
What is more, nothing in the Stanley opinion indicates that the
fundamental right to observe is limited to any particular object, such as
media, or to any particular location, such as the home.98 Nor does
anything in the opinion even hint that the right is limited to observations
that might somehow be valuable to the public interest. On the contrary,
the Court stressed, that the "right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society." 99 And
given the purposes of the First Amendment, it could hardly be otherwise.
Obviously, the "free trade in ideas,,o and "competition of the
market"10' for truth could never get very far if government could freely
restrict or forbid the observations of the world on which ideas are
ultimately based.10 2 "Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of
the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to
conduct human affairs."' 0 3 What better way to squelch debate about
96. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 568.
98. Id. at 564. As to obscenity, which is unprotected speech, later cases have
confined the right to observe to non-public venues. See Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-68 & 67 n.13 (1973). But the Court has never indicated that
there is any locational restriction on the fundamental right to observe things other
than obscenity.
99. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
100. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id.
102. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("[T]he State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of
available knowledge."); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 576-77 (1980) ("The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish
concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe
the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily."). The same can be said more
generally: The rights to speak and to publish concerning whatever takes place
anywhere would lose much meaning if access to observe were foreclosed.
103. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667
(2011). Even if the Supreme Court had not declared observation to be a
"fundamental" right, it might still be constitutionally protected as conduct that is an
integral part of communication. The only observation that might arguably be mere
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some government abuse than by forbidding people to observe it, even
when it occurs in plain sight? Without a fundamental right to observe,
the constitutional right to free expression would be a hollow vanity, and
this is why, no doubt, the Court has analogously affirmed that there is
"an undoubted right to gather news from any source by means within the
law."'0 This does not mean, of course, that governmental bodies have to
give unlimited public access to their inner workings or facilities. 0 5 A
right to observe is not, for example, a right to physically intrude.106 But it
does mean, however, as the Supreme Court has made clear, that once
information is out and in public hands, it is fair game for public
observation and communication.'07
conduct as opposed to being a part of "speech" would be an observation that occurs
with no view to or possibility of ever being communicated (e.g., of a dying man on a
desert island). All normal observation with a view to or potential for communication
is, however, another matter. The collection of information for the purpose of
communicating it is conduct that is an essential prerequisite to any intelligent or
informed expression, and the right to free expression would be near meaningless if
government could impose whatever restrictions it wanted on the observations on
which virtually all communications depend.
104. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted). While Houchins involved the rights of the press, the Court's statement
should apply with equal force to the rights of individuals because, as the Court has
made clear, "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right
of special access to information not available to the public generally." Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
782 (1978) ("[T]he press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment
or the ability to enlighten.").
105. E.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9-11 (denying that the press has "a special
privilege of access to information as distinguished from a right to publish
information which has been obtained"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(upholding denial of press access to prisons); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1965) (saying, by way of example, that a citizen does not have a right of "entry into
the White House . . . to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of
the way the country is being run").
106. E.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9-11; Pell, 417 U.S. at 827; Zemel, 381 U.S.
at 16-17.
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)
(summarizing the Court's previous holding in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977), as follows: "[O]nce the truthful information was
'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could not constitutionally
restrain its dissemination."); see also Houchins, 438 U.S. at 10 ("[T]he government
cannot restrain communication of whatever information the media acquire-and
2012] PRIVACY AND FREE EXPRESSION 45
Even though the First Amendment right to observe is
"fundamental," it is presumably not absolute. It should presumably still
be subject to the same standard limitations that apply to the right of free
expression.o As such, the right to observe could, for example, be
limited by laws that are able to pass strict scrutiny, such as those
protecting military secrets in the interest of national security.109 The right
to observe would also be subject to the categorical exclusions from First
Amendment protection, such as those for child pornography and
obscenity.1 o Moreover, the right to observe can apparently-and
logically-be "incidentally" burdened by laws of general application that
serve substantial governmental purposes other than restricting First
Amendment interests as such."' A foremost example of this latter kind
of law is the law of property, which will be discussed below.112
Where the standard limitations on First Amendment freedoms do
not apply, however, the Supreme Court has never questioned the basic
principle in Stanley that an individual has a "fundamental" right "to . . .
which they elect to reveal."). The Court later recognized that there might be possible
exceptions where there is "a need to further a state interest of the highest order,"
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989), though exceptions of that nature
would seem to be readily subsumed under the doctrine of strict scrutiny. Most of the
cases focus on the right to communicate rather than to observe confidential
government information that gets out into the public sphere. However, the right to
observe must be presupposed or else a right to communicate would not make any
sense.
Again, as noted earlier, press cases like those cited in this footnote should apply
with equal force to the rights of individuals. See supra note 103.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
109. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating that the First
Amendment would not protect the "publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops"); cf Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding a law banning all material support for
terrorist organizations even though the law was a content-based restriction on
political speech and suggesting that there is a relatively broad national security
exception to the First Amendment); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)
(stating that the right to receive information must yield to the apparently boundless
power of Congress to exclude foreign nationals from U.S. territory).
110. E.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (child pornography); Paris
Adult Theatre 1 v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (obscenity).
111. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also infra
Part V.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 218-72.
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observe what he pleases."" 3 Government is, in other words, severely
constrained by the Constitution in regulating what people can lawfully
see and hear, just as it is constrained in limiting what people can say and
write. Since people and their property comprise together just about
everything there is, little would be left to see and hear if, in the name of
privacy, laws could forbid persons from observing one another or one
another's possessions that have not been concealed. In summary, it is
very dubious that laws could constitutionally forbid persons who are
otherwise acting lawfully from looking at other people or their
possessions that are available to view.
B. Other Possible Illegality in Obtaining Information
Even though a fundamental right to observe may not allow laws
that restrict observation as such, it is still possible that observations could
involve independently unlawful means or ends that would put them
within the categorical exception for speech "integral to criminal
conduct.""14 There is, for instance, no general First Amendment right to
violate property rights"5 even when the purpose of the property violation
is to express informationll6 or to gather it. This principle, as applied to
113. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). For other cases recognizing
the principle since Stanley, see Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) ("[W]e have held that in a variety of
contexts 'the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."'); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-
57 (1976) (acknowledging "a First Amendment right to receive information and
ideas, and that freedom of speech necessarily protects the right to receive") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(specifically involving the right to gather news); Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762-63
(upholding the "right to receive information" as a protected constitutional interest).
114. Or, more broadly, to unlawful conduct. See supra notes 80-84 and
accompanying text.
115. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (approving application of
trespass law to entries without permission for the purpose of distributing leaflets);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (denying that there is a First Amendment
right to trespass in order to advertise a strike against the owner); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68 (1972) (denying that there is a First Amendment right
to distribute political leaflets on private property without permission).
116. See Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122-23; Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520-21; Tanner,
407 U.S. at 567-68.
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the right to observe, would mean that, when private information is
acquired by engaging in unlawful conduct such as trespass to land or to
chattels, the illegality of the means of observation could support a ban on
its disclosure. Such a ban, resting ultimately on ordinary property rights,
would fall neatly within the broad categorical exclusion for "speech
integral to unlawful conduct."" 8
Before discussing the "property rights" basis for protecting
private information, however, we will look at four other possible ways
that illegality could arguably be invoked to make the observation and
dissemination of private information regulable as acts integral to
unlawful conduct. First, a law could make it illegal to gather private
information by recording, either generally or under specified
circumstances.120 If such a law were valid,121 then the dissemination of
the recordings could be regulated as speech integral to unlawful
conduct.122 Another possibility is that a law could declare it a crime or
117. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 n.19 (2001) (stating that there
is no First Amendment right to steal information or conduct private wiretapping). Cf
supra note 103.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 205-09.
119. See infra Part V.
120. For example, the federal or state wiretap laws which, it should be
stressed, do not confine themselves to "wiretapping" but also embrace forms of
eavesdropping on ordinary mouth-to-ear communications. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (2006) (prohibiting interception of "oral" communications); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 631-632 (West 2012) (accord); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1-
5/14-2 (West 2012) (accord); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (LexisNexis
2010) (accord); N.Y. PENAL LAW, 250.05 (McKinney 2012) ("mechanical
overhearing of a conversation").
121. Apart from First Amendment considerations, it is not clear why
government could not constitutionally ban the use of recording devices altogether.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (noting that the Court applies a
"relatively lenient standard to those cases in which 'the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression"') (quoting United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). In any case, there seems to be no doubt that government
can ban the use of recording devices selectively, such as under the federal or state
wiretap laws mentioned in the preceding footnote.
122. This argument failed in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
However, the Court left open the possibility that, under different facts, a different
outcome might be reached. id. at 531-33 (stating that "this is the exceptional case"
and that "the outcome of the case does not turn on whether [18 U.S.C.A.] §
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tort to disseminate private information gathered without the consent of
the persons referred to, which, again, would make the observation and
dissemination of such information regulable as acts integral to unlawful
conduct. Thirdly, and analogously, a law could make it unlawful to
gather information about people covertly. Finally, there is the possibility
that the Constitution does not fully protect the gathering or dissemination
of information at all unless it relates to matters of public concern,
allowing the states much broader latitude in outlawing the free flow of
"non-pubic concern" information. However, each of these four possible
ways to bring privacy laws under the "integral to illegality" categorical
exception share the same problem: each of the possible predicate crimes
is itself subject to serious First Amendment objections. The four
possibilities will be discussed in turn.
1. The Right to Record
As advances in cell phone technology make handheld audio and
video recording devices ever more widespread, people no longer have to
rely on their memories to recollect what they see and hear. They need not
rely solely on their personal powers of elocution to communicate their
experiences to others. By simply pulling out a modern wireless phone,
everything can be recorded reliably and completely,123 dramatically
enhancing mere unassisted memory. When the results are later shown to
others who were not present at the actual event, these other persons are
virtually present at the original scene. This newly enhanced technology
of digitally assisted memory can, no doubt, cause considerable unease to
those who do things they are not proud of or do not want others to know
about. As modern digital devices provide incomparably persuasive
accounts of the facts and events of the world, they can explode the most
2511(1)(c) may be enforced with respect to most violations of the statute without
offending the First Amendment").
123. See Press Release, Qumu Survey: 50% ofAmericans Say They Would Use
Smartphones to Take Secret Videos
(Oct. 10, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.qumu.com/news/446-qumu-survey-50-of-
americans-say-they-would-use-smartphones-to-take-secret-videos.html; Steve
Ragan, Smartphones Are Handy Tools For Video Voyeurs, THE TECH HERALD (Oct.
12, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201141/7719/
Smartphones-are-handy-tools-for-video-voyeurs.
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carefully crafted false reputations and calculated efforts at
misinformation. They destroy deniability.124
In recent times, there has been a flurry of attention and even
litigation concerning the propriety of punishing the use of digitally
assisted memory devices (such as mobile phone video cameras)
particularly in the context of impromptu efforts to document dodgy
police work. Since the technological devices at issue have precisely
the purpose of improving the dissemination of information-the very
thing that the First Amendment exists to promote-it is surprising that
124. While the use of such devices could destroy false deniability, it could also
tend to reinforce truthful denials, thus protecting the honest against the falsehoods
and perjury of others. For the point that the First Amendment also supports a right to
attempt, by free expression, to create a "false" reputation, see supra note 69.
125. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[T]hough not
unqualified, a citizen's right to film government officials, including law enforcement
officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-
established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment."); Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (granted qualified immunity to police on
ground that "the right to videotape police officers during traffic stops was not clearly
established" at the time); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10C5235, 2011 WL 66030, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011) (stating that there is no First Amendment right to record
police), rev'd, ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2011); Allison v.
Illinois, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40490 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (prosecution for recording
conversations with police), aff'g Allison v. Illinois, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40019
(S.D. Ill. 2011); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 2001)
(applying MASS. GEN, LAWS ch. 272, § 99); Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy
in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to
Preserve the Civilian's Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L.
REv. 487 (2011); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture And The First
Amendment: Memory, Discourse, And The Right To Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335
(2011); Michael Potere, Who Will Watch The Watchers?: Citizens Recording Police
Conduct, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 273 (2012) (arguing that "prior restraint" doctrine
disallows laws to ban citizen recording of police activity); Radley Balko, The War
on Cameras, REASON MAGAZINE (Jan. 2011), available at
http://reason.com/archives/2010/12/07/the-war-on-cameras; Jason Meisner & Ryan
Haggarty, Woman Who Recorded Cops Acquitted Of Felony Eavesdropping
Charges, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2011, at 1; Radley Balko, Chicago District Attorney
Lets Bad Cops Slide, Prosecutes Citizens Who Record Them, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/08/chicago-district-attorney-
recording-bad-cops n 872921.html; cf David Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn
Video Devices (11ead Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance
by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357 (2010) (providing excellent insights on a
somewhat different side of this issue).
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there is any serious legal controversy about their use. Nonetheless, there
is, and some excellent scholarship has already been done on the right to
use devices, such as video recorders in public settings.126 No attempt will
be made to replicate or recite that work here. Instead, I will confine the
present discussion to a few points concerning the right to record other
persons in public.
First, while recording alone has elements that may be regarded
as non-speech "conduct," it does not follow that recording bans should
be assessed under the "relatively lenient standard" that the Supreme
Court uses for conduct regulations that impose only "incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms."l27 Undeniably, the real target
of most laws that forbid recording is communication, precisely the
activity that the First Amendment protects.128 Whatever might be the
government's power to "incidentally" regulate expressive conduct, it
"may not . . . proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive
elements." 2 9 And it is surely the communicative potential of recording
that motivates the laws to restrict it. After all, no one could be sensibly
concerned about recordings that are certain never to be seen or heard. In
passing laws that target recording, there is only one kind of harm that
lawmakers could plausibly have in mind, namely, the "harm" that might
ensue from playback, actual or potential, i.e., communicative harm.
However, the "guarantee of freedom of expression makes the
communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out
that conduct for proscription."'3 0 In short, a recording ban, being
"directed at the communicative nature of conduct[,] must, like a law
directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need
that the First Amendment requires."'31
126. See, e.g., Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why
the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious
Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1009 (2009); Alderman,
supra note 125; Kreimer, supra note 125; Potere, supra note 125.
127. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989). See infra text accompanying
notes 211-15.
128. Cf Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406-08.
129. Id. at 406.
130. Id. (emphasis omitted).
131. Id. (emphasis omitted). In the case of content-discrimination, the
"substantial showing of need" means, in today's terminology, strict scrutiny. Id. at
412 (requiring "the most exacting scrutiny").
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Second, just as recording cannot be regulated on the ground that
the results might be seen or heard, the playback itself should be
constitutionally protected. Indeed, it is hard to regard the playback of a
recording as anything but "pure speech."1 3 2 What else can one say of
conduct that is engaged in for the sole purpose of communicating facts,
opinion or emotive effect and that would otherwise have virtually no
impact on the world?'3 3 As the Supreme Court has said, "if the acts of
'disclosing' and 'publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is
,,134hard to imagine what does . .. Accordingly, delivering a recording is
"the kind of 'speech' that the First Amendment protects,"135 and if
delivering a recording is protected "speech," then playing it must be. In
short, the act of recording functions almost entirely and solely as an
integral part of communication, and laws to regulate recording are
regulations of speech, pure and simple. That being so, restrictions on
recording presumably would have to be justified using one of the several
standard grounds for allowing restrictions on First Amendment rights.13
Third, there is the question of whether restricting the use of
digitally assisted memory devices can be justified as regulations on
merely the "time, place, or manner" of speech.'37 Under certain
conditions, reasonable "time, place, or manner" regulations are
permissible even though they may impinge on particular First
Amendment activity.138 The argument for applying the "time, place or
manner" justification to recording bans would rest on the fact that such
bans do not absolutely prevent the information from being
communicated but, rather, they merely restrict the manner of
communication. Although, the argument would go, recording bans forbid
a particular "manner" of communication, they still allow the information
to be conveyed in other ways, such as by word of mouth. The argument
132. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001).
133. The only other thing that it does, one supposes, is to use up the recording
materials, which, in the case of digital recording, is practically negligible.
134. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109,
120 (3d Cir. 1999)).
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
137. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
138. Id.; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984).
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does not, however, work. For although the Supreme Court does indeed
interpret the First Amendment to allow reasonable restrictions on the
manner of expressing protected speech, such restrictions are permissible
only under three conditions: The restrictions must be (i) "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech," (ii) "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," and (iii) "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." 3 9 The problem with applying the "time, place, or manner"
argument to privacy laws is that, when recording bans are enacted for the
specific purpose of protecting private information, they raise issues under
all three of these conditions.
The first of the three conditions, that the restrictions be justified
without reference to content, runs into obvious difficulty when the
recording prohibitions at issue apply only to recordings that
communicate information about people in certain "private" situations-
as does, for example, the New Jersey statute in the Ravi-Wei case.140
Such a statute simply does not satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement
of content-neutrality. A regulation of expression is considered to be
content-neutral only if it "serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression."l41 It is hard to see, however, how New Jersey has any
purpose except to prevent certain content from being disseminated.
Essentially the same can be said when laws ban the recording of private
activities tied to the protection of "seclusion," such as those
contemplated by the Second Restatement of Torts § 652B.142 Because the
Restatement's ban extends only information about a single class of
subject matter (others' private activities, affairs, or concerns), they are
anything but content-neutral.
The second of the three conditions, that the legal restrictions
must serve a "significant governmental interest," may also encounter
constitutional difficulty. It was earlier noted that there is already the
question of defining a "compelling" governmental interest in protecting
private information,144 particularly insofar as what would really be
139. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
140. See supra note 16.
141. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
143. Id.; see also supra note 19.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 45-79.
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protected is calculated disinformation or a false reputation. For the same
reason, one may legitimately wonder whether recording bans enacted for
the purpose of protecting private information serve any "significant"
governmental interest, as required by "time, place, or manner"
restrictions. It is not completely obvious whether they do or not, though
it should be observed that the standard used by the Court in "time, place,
or manner" cases is a "relatively lenient" one.145
Perhaps the most problematic of the three "time, place, or
manner" conditions is the one requiring the speech regulations at issue to
leave ample alternative channels for communication of the information.
The difficulty here lies with the concept of "ample." To be sure, even if
the law forbids recording a person or event using technology, there are
almost always alternative ways to register and express the content in
question, such as by simply watching and then telling people what
happened. There is, however, a serious problem with forcing people to
fall back on that ultra-low tech alternative. The legal prohibition on
presenting recorded documentation of an occurrence can reduce,
sometimes drastically, the emotive impact of the information being
conveyed. To "show" is almost always more powerful than merely to
"say." If government could forbid people from delivering certain kinds
of information in the most effective way they see fit-for example, with
visual corroboration-it could easily circumvent the content-neutrality
that the First Amendment requires.146 Recordings make messages more
believable by providing evidence and corroboration for their truth. If the
government could prohibit presentation of proof of the facts asserted in a
message, the impact of the message could easily be diluted and, indeed,
it might not be believable at all. The idea that that government may
145. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989).
146. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) ("The
government may not regulate [expression] based on hostility--or favoritism--towards
the underlying message expressed."); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 643 (1994) ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are
content[-]based."). To take an extreme case, imagine a law providing that pro-
government messages can be presented on TV in vivid color action clips with music
and other sounds while anti-government messages could be presented only by
silently scrolling text across an otherwise blank screen.
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choose to allow certain ideas or information to be expressed only weakly
or with muted impact is at odds with the cases.147
Consider, for example, the factual setting of Bartnicki v.
Vopper.148 During tense teachers union negotiations, an unknown person
secretly recorded the union president as he was saying to the union's
chief negotiator: "we're gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . [t]o
blow off their front porches . . . ." (referring to the members of the board
of education).149 After a radio station played the recording on the air, the
individuals who were recorded sued unsuccessfully for damages. 150
Although a verbal description of the conversation would have technically
told the world what the union leader said, surely it was more credible,
not to mention effective, to play his actual words spoken in his own
147. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2653,
2671 (2011) (rejecting the idea "that the force of speech can justify the government's
attempts to stifle it"); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. , _, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219
(2011) ("'If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."') (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (rejecting idea that emotive foreign-affairs
considerations of picketing an embassy justify suppressing the expression); Johnson,
491 U.S. at 406-07 (denying that emotive impact of flag burning is reason to ban it);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (discussing the "emotive function" of
speech "which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element").
The upshot of these cases seems to be that the government may not restrict messages
with which it disagrees, "dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to
express an idea." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416. Indeed, a restriction that is imposed
based on "the likely communicative impact of . . . expressive conduct . . . is content
based." Id. at 411-12. "The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
'secondary effect' unrelated to the content of the expression itself," id. at 412, and
accordingly, government "may not . . . proscribe particular conduct because it has
expressive elements." Id. at 406-07. Thus, when a "restriction on expression cannot
be 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech' . . . it must be
subjected to 'the most exacting scrutiny."' United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
317-18 (1990) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988)).
148. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
149. Id. at 518-19.
150. Id. at 515. The suit was brought under state and federal wiretapping laws
which prohibited, among other things, the interception of "wire, electronic, and oral
communications" and the disclosure of the contents of any such intercepted
communication. Id. The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to apply the
wiretap laws to prevent the disclosures by the defendants in the case, i.e., persons
who were not parties to the original illegal interception. Id.
voice. It would defeat the content-neutrality that the First Amendment
requires if government could decide that people wanting to convey
certain content are only allowed to state their case verbally but not to use
recordings or similar documentation to back up their factual assertions.15
If the right to communicate is to be real, then rights to provide evidence
and corroboration by means of recording, like the right to observe, would
seem to follow as a matter of course.
One last point, just to be clear: It is presupposed throughout the
foregoing discussion that the recordings in question are made without
1 52violating any other person's independent, non-speech related, rights,
such as property rights. It is recognized, in other words, that laws
protecting such independent rights, as further discussed below,'53 may be
valid even though they impose "incidental" burdens on First Amendment
freedoms so long as they are not aimed at restricting speech selectively
on the basis of its content. Thus, the protected First Amendment status
for recording would not apply, for example, to recordings that are made
using taps violating valid federal and state wiretap laws or accomplished
154by means of trespasses to lands or chattels of others. But laws to
151. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671 ("In an attempt to reverse a disfavored
trend in public opinion, a State could not ban campaigning with slogans, picketing
with signs, or marching during the daytime.").
152. More broadly, "independent" rights is used here to refer to any rights
other than a right, as such, not to be the subject of communication, viz. a "right of
privacy."
153. See infra Part V.
154. But cf Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529-30 (striking down the application of
some parts of wiretap statutes), discussed supra text accompanying notes 148-51
and infra text accompanying notes 191-96.
In an interesting related vein, Professor Adam Kolber has recently considered
(and essentially rejected) the idea that laws criminalizing device-assisted cognitive
enhancement could be justified in the context of card counting at blackjack tables.
Adam J. Kolber, Criminalizing Cognitive Enhancement at the Blackjack Table, in
MEMORY AND LAW 307 (L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds., 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2138358. However, blackjack games are quite possibly one
of the exceptional places where cognitive device prohibitions actually could be
justified on the ground, simply, that casinos are entitled to set the rules under which
they are willing to play and, according to Kolber, the casinos' rules do, in fact,
exclude the use by players of cognitive-enhancement devices that could assist in
counting cards. Under these circumstances, for a player to pretend to comply with
the casino's rule in order to secure a place at the blackjack table would be a form of
larceny or false pretense. In most other circumstances of life, however, there are
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restrict recording because of its communicative capacity raise, at the very
least, serious constitutional questions.
2. Observing Without Consent
It is likely that most of us would find it offensive to be looked at
or listened to against our will. People have an understandable desire to be
able to say no to the observations of others. At the same time, however,
for government to make it unlawful to see or hear others in plain sight
would cut into individual autonomy at a most basic level and
significantly impinge on people's other legitimate interests. Quite apart
from the unparalleled intrusiveness that would attend laws forbidding
observations of persons and possessions in plain sight, people have
legitimate self-protection interests in knowing what is going on around
them. Those who desire most fervently to not be seen or heard might,
after all, be up to no good. To be sure, people may more typically want to
go unobserved with no ulterior reason at all, but such desires may also
reflect a realistic fear of legitimate disapprobation or intervention by
others. When this may be the case, the others have a right to know.
One way to resolve the tension between the interest in observing
and the interest in not being observed is to create some sort of
presumption of consent, deeming observations to be consensual if certain
conditions are present (for example, the observation occurs in a public
location). On this theory, when persons put themselves or their
possessions where they can be observed by others lawfully present, they
are "deemed" to manifest consent to the others' observations. ss Thus, a
person would be deemed to consent to observations by others of such
things as the photos on her laptop screen in a coffee shop, her
conversions on public sidewalks, or her actions done while riding on a
bus or subway. Such a presumption would probably be consistent with
neither any such anti-device "rules of play" to comply with nor "false pretense" of
compliance. One person has as much right to use memory assistance in personal
interactions as others have to refuse such interactions.
155. For example, consent could be presumed in public or semi-public places,
i.e., privately owned locales that are generally open to the public, such as stores,
malls, sports stadiums, movie houses, and other such venues. See Skehill, supra note
126, at 1009 (discussing the Massachusetts court's apparent embrace of "knowledge
[as] consent" in Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001)).
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the likely expectations of most people, not to mention with the existence
of a fundamental right to observe and acquire knowledge about the world
156
around us. Indeed, a presumption that everyone consents to being seen
and heard in public is practically a corollary to any genuine right to
observe.
However, a legal fiction of consent is, in the end, an unneeded
analytical contrivance. For how could anyone ever have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in relation to actions done or possessions left in
the plain view of others who are lawfully present?157 Consider, for
example, a couple asserting a right to engage, unobserved, in "heavy
156. See supra Part IV.A.
157. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Drennon, 202 S.W.3d 308, 320 (Tex. App. 2006)
("One cannot expect to be entitled to seclusion when standing directly in front of a
large window with the blinds open or while outside."); Baugh v. Fleming, No. 03-
08-00321-CV, 2009 WL 5149928, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2009) (recognizing
possibility of reasonable expectation of privacy when "the window of a home is not
observable .. . in the normal course of non-intrusive activities . . ."); see also Fiorillo
v. Berkley Adm'rs, No. CV010458400S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1210, at *8
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 2004) (covert videography was not an intrusion on privacy
where person "was in plain view of the public and was not videotaped or viewed in a
private place or in a manner that revealed her private affairs so as to be outrageous,
highly offensive or unreasonable"); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d
935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (appearing in a public place "necessarily involves
doffing the cloak of privacy which the law protects"); Forster v. Manchester, 189
A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. 1963) ("[A]ppellant has exposed herself to public observation
and therefore is not entitled to the same degree of privacy that she would enjoy
within the confines of her own home."); Tagouma v. Investigative Consultant Servs.,
No. 2006 CV 1532 CV, 2009 WL 7165852, at *14-15 (Pa. D. & C. May 28, 2009)
("watching or observing a person in a public place, or taking a photograph of a
person who can be observed from a public vantage point, is not generally an
invasion of privacy"). Other cases include: Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721
F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he broadcast provided the public with nothing
more than could have been seen from a public street. Consequently, no invasion of
privacy occurred."); Dempsey v. Nat'l Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927, 931 (D. Maine
1988) ("[T]aking a photograph of the plaintiff in a public place cannot constitute an
invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon the seclusion of another."); Machleder
v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364, 1374 (S.D.N.Y 1982) (accosting and filming a person
"in a semi-public area [where he was visible] to the public eye"). But cf Wolfson v.
Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Conduct that amounts to a
persistent course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable surveillance, even if
conducted in a public or semi-public place, may nevertheless rise to the level of
invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion.").
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petting" or other such behavior on an airliner in flight, in a car parked on
the street, on a public beach, or in their dinner host's dining room.1
While persons may conceivably harbor expectations that others around
them will avert their eyes and stuff up their ears, the expectations would
hardly be reasonable. It serves no socially important interest to accord
legal protection to expectations that are unreasonable. Stated differently,
the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy means it is not
reasonable to impinge on others' freedom to see and hear what goes on
in plain view.
It has already been noted that government would not likely have
a compelling interest in prohibiting people from communicating personal
information about others as to which there was no reasonable expectation
of privacy." 9 Analogously, in the absence of reasonable expectations of
privacy, there would be no compelling interest to justify cutting into the
fundamental right to observe by persons lawfully present and in a
position to do so. Quite apart from whether people being observed have
"consented" to the observations, reasonable expectations of privacy
should be a minimum pre-requisite before the observations can be
declared illegal.160 When a person does not want her words or deeds to be
observed by others, the reasonable thing to do is to take care not to act or
speak in others' sight and hearing. 161 A law that protects unreasonable
privacy expectations could not likely survive strict scrutiny.
158. Compare the prosecutions of people for trying to make video recordings
of police conduct carried out in plain public view. See supra notes 124-26.
159. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
160. Id. Consider 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006), which extends legal protection
against non-wiretap eavesdropping only to communications that are "uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." (emphasis added).
161. For these purposes, the idea of "plain" view should not, as either a
semantic or logical matter, encompass perceptions that can be accomplished only by
means of artificial enhancements such as telescopes, long-range microphones or
other digitally-assisted perception devices. That is to say, the covert acquisition of
private information is to be distinguished from the covert recording of information
that one should reasonably know is on display. See supra text accompanying notes
123-53. This difference exists because expectations of privacy are fundamentally
expectations about whether, under the circumstances, one is making personal
information accessible to others lawfully present. Thus, it is only reasonable to
expect to be seen or heard when doing acts or speaking in the sight or hearing of
others but, since we do not normally expect to be subject to surveillance by
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3. Covert Observation
Sneakiness never has good connotations, and one can easily
detect in the law a distinct unfriendliness toward covert observations of
others, even in the absence of artifice or trickery. In disciplinary
proceedings, for example, lawyers who just simply record others without
their knowledge are sometimes condemned for having engaged in a
"deceptive" practice,162 and federal law makes it an offense to
manufacture devices that are "primarily useful for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception" of communications.' One arguable ground
for restricting covert observations is that they are, at least when
perception-enhancement devices, there is normally a reasonable expectation of
privacy as long as there are no others in eye- or earshot. See Digirolamo v. D.P.
Anderson & Assocs., Civ.A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592, at *3 (Mass. Super. May
26, 1999) ("[U]nenhanced vision from a location where the observer may properly
be does not impair a legitimate expectation of privacy. However, any enhanced
viewing of the interior of a home does impair a legitimate expectation of privacy and
encounters the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement . . . ." (quoting United States
v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980)). Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy from use of
enhancement devices not in routine use), with Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227 (1986) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy from use of mapping
cameras in aircraft). On the other hand, once a person makes an item of information
accessible to reasonably anticipatable perceptions of others, the information
ceases-absent a confidential relationship or agreement-to be "private"
information and becomes "shared" information instead. The person who has made
the information available can no longer exert autonomy over the information without
impinging the autonomy of others over their own knowledge. She cannot, for
example, control the means by which those who have acquired the information
choose to register or store it.
162. Gunter v. Va. State Bar, 385 S.E.2d 597, 600 (Va. 1989) (affirming an
attorney's suspension from practice); People v. Selby, 606 P.2d 45, 47 (Colo. 1979)
(ordering disbarment), followed by People v. Wallin, 621 P.3d 330, 331 (Colo.
1981). But cf Attorney M v. Miss. Bar, 621 So. 2d 220, 224 (Miss. 1992) ("Ethical
complications arise not so much from surreptitious recordings per se as from the
manner in which attorneys use them."); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1
Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001) (withdrawing an earlier blanket
prohibition and limiting the ban on secret recording to "circumstances that make it
unethical").
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b) (2006).
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unexpected,164 almost by definition without real consent. However, when
the observations occur in the absence of reasonable expectations of
privacy, this ground encounters the objections that were discussed in the
previous subpart. In any case, it is not so clear that a policy to
discourage surreptitiousness in general can justify impingements on First
Amendment interests.
To be sure, even a constitutional right to observe should not
necessarily prevent laws that make it a crime to acquire private
information by stealth methods. For example, a prohibition against
surreptitious observations could, at least in some circumstances, serve
ends similar to those served by the First Amendment's categorical
exception for fraud.166 There should not, for instance, be constitutional
concerns about a law that forbids covert observations that are made after
the observer has falsely represented that no such observations will occur.
164. This qualification of unexpectedness is meant to put aside instances of
semi-covert observation in which persons enter into a place, such as a bank lobby,
gambling casino or airport security line, where it is a matter of common knowledge
that surveillance often occurs. Such "customs of recording" can arguably have at
least two different important effects on the analysis. First, if a person who enters a
place where she know surveillance is likely to occur, she can reasonably be deemed
to have consented to the surveillance. Second, if a person reasonably should know
that a camera or microphone is likely to be in operation, that would seem to exclude
the possibility of a "reasonable" expectation of privacy. The observation in such a
situation would not, therefore, "invade" privacy. Note, however, that the converse is
not necessarily true. Just because a person has no reason to know that a surveillance
device is in operation, it does not follow that the person does have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. There may be many other reasons why, in the particular
location or situation, persons cannot reasonably expect to go unseen or unheard (e.g.,
a hidden camera in the lobby of a public bus station).
165. See supra Part IV.B.1.
166. "'[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with
reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection."' Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964)). See also Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600,
612 (2003) ( "[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud."); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[T]he intentional lie" is "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas."). The Court frequently lists fraud among the categories that
are outside First Amendment protection. See eg,, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.,
, -, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,
299 (2008).
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In many situations, however, covert surveillance is not exactly
"fraudulent" but simply unannounced. It simply happens, for example,
that someone gathers information about others but does not, for reasons
of convenience or otherwise, let them know about it. These situations
range in intuitive dubiousness from things like data mining on the
Internetl67 to sitting idly in a parked car and watching passers-by amble
down the street.'6 Most "covert" observations consist, no doubt, of
things as commonplace as the unobtrusive and unnoticed security
cameras that are becoming ubiquitous in restaurants, department stores
and other such semi-public locales. In many instances, however, covert
observations may be the only means of getting vital information about
others' bad behavior-information that may be highly valuable for one's
own decisions or well-being.16 9 Indeed, because it is a characteristic of
bad behavior that it tends to be deliberately concealed, a degree of stealth
is frequently necessary in order to obtain information, or to correct
misinformation about it.170 Covert observations raise, in other words, a
problem of competing secrecies-the secrecy of the observer versus the
secrecy desired by the person being observed. When both sides act
"covertly," covertness per se hardly seems an apt prima facie ground for
denouncing either side for the benefit of the other. Be that as it may,
however, laws that ban covert observation, whatever their rationale,
impinge unavoidably on the interests furthered by the fundamental right
167. Cf Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)
(concerning data mining, but apparently not on the Internet).
168. Such an observation may be considered sensitive if, for example, the
person walking down the street had just exited a Narcotics Anonymous drug
treatment center. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] U.K.H.L. 22 available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/palld2003O4/ldjudgmt/jdO40506/campbe-
1.htm.
169. For example, a supermarket plagued by shoplifting might install hidden
cameras to observe customer activity in its aisles.
170. Cf Gidatex v. Campaniello Imp. Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456,
475-76 (D. N.J. 1998) (recognizing that deceit may be necessary to uncover
wrongdoing). See generally Kathryn A. Thompson, Legal White Lies: Courts and
Regulators Strive to Identify When a Little Deception is Not So Bad, 91 A.B.A.J. 34,
34 (2005) (discussing the circumstances under which the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct should permit the use of deceit in conducting investigations on
lawyer misconduct).
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to observe,171 ultimately imposing burdens on the value of getting at the
truth. The question is whether and when such laws can be
constitutionally justified.
Generally speaking, laws that make it a crime to covertly obtain
private information would presumably have to be justified on one of the
several standard grounds for allowing restrictions on First Amendment
interests.172 One possibility, already mentioned, is that a ban on covert
observation could be fit into the First Amendment's categorical
exception for "fraud." 73 Another categorical exception, for conduct
integral to a crime, should allow bans on covert observations that are
accomplished by criminal intrusions on property interests-whether the
target's or others'-such as by hacking into a computer over the
Internet.174
Passing strict scrutiny provides another basis for upholding laws
that impinge on First Amendment interests, but it seems somewhat
unpromising that laws against covert acquisition of information could, as
a general matter, pass strict scrutiny. In particular, it is difficult to see
how such a law could serve a "compelling" governmental interest in light
of the competing secrecies and the competing, but prima facie legitimate,
private autonomy interests that are typically involved.
In any case, short of some draconian ban on the possession and
use of what has become everyday technology, any legal effort to stem the
burgeoning practice of covert information acquisition is almost certainly
171. See supra Part IV.A.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
173. See supra text accompanying note 166.
174. See, e.g., 18 USC § 1030 (2006) (forbidding accessing a computer and
obtaining information from it either without authorization or exceeding authorized
access). The "property" argument would be, in short, that addressing the violation of
property interests is a valid governmental purpose and has only an "incidental"
impact on First Amendment interests. On this theory, there should be little difficulty
in concluding that a content-neutral prohibition on covert computer intrusions would
pass constitutional muster under the O'Brien rule. See infra text accompanying notes
211-15. Content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on First
Amendment interests will pass intermediate scrutiny as long as they are in
furtherance of a substantial state or governmental interest in protecting property
interests. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (content-neutral rules
forbidding trespass on private property do not violate the First Amendment).
175. See supra Part IlI.
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doomed to fail. With today's modem cell phones and other such
electronics, not to mention the increasingly widespread use of
inexpensive surveillance gadgets, the act of recording what others say
and do is simple, cheap and becoming ubiquitous. It is easy to imagine
that, within five years, people will be readily able to buy devices the size
of tiny in-the-ear hearing aids that can digitally record or transmit
everything that the wearer hears for later reference as necessary. It is
hard to imagine that such devices will not quickly come into widespread
use. Who, for example, would want go into an important business
negotiation or a sensitive personal discussion without one? The ancient
"he said/she said" imponderables will soon be a thing of the past.
Thus, as technology makes covert observation not only easier but
also more useful, the original hostility toward it may whither away and,
looking back, it will one day seem like a quaint technophobic reaction to
a valuable technique that was simply new.176 Indeed, as micro-scale
monitoring technologies become more commonplace, their use may even
cease to be seen as "surreptitious" at all and, instead, may even be taken
for granted. For the present, acquiring information covertly is indubitably
under a public-relations cloud. But, notably, in the leading Supreme
Court case on the subject, the Court decided not to permit the
suppression of information that had been gathered surreptitiously. 77
4. Outlawing Disclosures of Information of Purely Private Concern
One other possible theory for validly outlawing gathering and
dissemination of private information rests on the idea that the First
Amendment gives a lesser level of protection with respect to information
that does not relate to matters of public concern. If "private-concern"
176. Technophobia is timeless and need not be documented here. Many still
remember the fears generated by inventions such as movies, television and, perhaps
still, the Internet. Earlier the printing press generated similar fears and, 2500 years
ago, Socrates anguished over the evil effects to be wrought by the invention of
writing. Plato, The Phaedrus 117 (1st World Library ed. 2008) (in which Socrates
asserted that writing would give "not truth, but only the semblance of truth," with the
result that people will become "hearers of many things and will have learned
nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they
will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality").
177. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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information enjoys a lesser measure of constitutional protection, then
states would have a freer hand in adopting laws to regulate both the
gathering and the dissemination of such information. In the Second
Restatement of Torts § 652D, for example, public disclosure of a matter
concerning the private life of another is said to be unlawful if the matter
disclosed is "not of legitimate concern to the public."'18 Speech that
conveys such information, once validly declared to be "speech integral to
illegal conduct," would then be within a categorical exclusion from
constitutional protection. The question is whether such laws would be
insulated from First Amendment objection under the categorical
exclusion. The answer is probably no.
To begin with, there is to date no case actually holding that the
First Amendment gives a lesser level of protection for information not
relating to matters of public concern. Nonetheless, there is some
inferential authority for the idea, offering at least some succor to it.
When, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the right to disclose the
private information at issue in Bartnicki v. Vopper,17 9 it laid considerable
stress on the fact that the disclosure was about a "matter of public
concern.,,1s In thus differentiating between speech on public concerns
and on non-public concerns, the Bartnicki opinion echoed a line of late
twentieth-century defamation cases in which the Court dialed back the
"breathing space"18' that is accorded to non-malicious defamatory
utterances.182 Similarly, and even more strikingly, the Court offered the
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977), quoted in full supra
note 20. To be actionable, the matter disclosed must also be one that would be
"highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id. It is, of course, well established that
offensiveness alone is not a sufficient ground for removing First Amendment
protection. See cases cited supra note 8.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
180. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
181. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (citation
omitted). The "breathing space" concept is not limited to the defamation context.
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52, 56 (1988) (barring
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 388 (1967) (barring recovery for invasion of privacy).
182. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (plurality indicating that, absent a matter of public concern, presumed and
punitive damages could be allowed without proof of actual malice); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (stating that, absent a public figure, no showing of
actual malice is required); see also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
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obiter dictum in Snyder v. Phelps'83 that "restricting speech on purely
private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as
limiting speech on matters of public interest."l 8 4 There are, however,
several reasons why the Court's stress on "public concern" in Bartnicki
and Snyder might not be properly understood to mean that the states are
free in the privacy context to curtail truthful speech on matters that are
not of public concern.
First, when the Court in Bartnicki spoke of protecting "privacy,"
the interest in question was not just ordinary privacy. As the Court took
pains to point out, the case also involved the interest in private
communication, a First Amendment interest that deserves protection for
the purpose of "fostering private speech."18 5 In other words, Bartnicki
was a case that had First Amendment interests on both sides of the
"constitutional calculus."' 86 In the more general privacy situation,
however, where the First Amendment interest in "fostering private
speech" is not present, the usual First Amendment interest in free
(1979) (stating that in libel action no showing of actual malice is required for
recovery); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (pointing out that the actual
malice standard does not apply to non-public figures). Note that, as defamation
cases, the above cases are not, strictly speaking, direct precedents for cases that
involve impingements on First Amendment interests that are not justified or
bolstered by any categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection. They are
not, that is to say, direct precedents for cases in which the opposing interest to be
served is privacy.
183. 562 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
184. Id at 1215. Even though the Court in Snyder said at one point that "this
case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern," id. at 1215
(emphasis added), the Court cautioned later that "the reach of our opinion here is
limited by the particular facts before us." Id. at 1220. Thus, while the Court clearly
said that the public-concern nature of the speech in Snyder meant that the First
Amendment was required, it did not ever say-and it seemed to expressly exclude-
any holding that private-concern speech was not protected. Indeed, on a fair reading
of the case, the arguments for and against protecting purely private interest speech
were not even considered by the Court-quite properly, moreover, because the
record did not raise the question. Id.
185. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518. Cf Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct.
2811 (2010) (rejecting the contention that disclosures of speech (signing petitions)
would "in general" violate the First Amendment rights of those who sign referendum
petitions).
186. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
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communication would weigh unequivocally on the side of protecting the
right to disclose.
Second, the only place where the public/private distinction has
really made a difference to the Court's holdings is in cases, such as
defamation cases, that already involve established exceptions to First
Amendment protection. These cases fall, therefore, into a
distinguishable little genre of their own because the speech they involve
is presumptively not protected by the Constitution in the first place.1 By
contrast to the defamation context, however, the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence has never included a categorical exception for
truthful communications of private information. There is no reason in the
Court's holdings to think, therefore, that such communications are
anything other than presumptively protected as speech. If that is so, then
laws aiming to restrict such communications should only be valid if one
of the standard grounds for suppressing protected speech can be shown
to apply.189 This distinction between defamatory falsehoods and truthful
statements is not, moreover, merely an arid technical legalism. "There is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact."' 90 Revelatory
statements of truth are an entirely different matter.
187. See cases cited supra notes 181-82. Another exceptional kind of case,
mentioned by the Court in Snyder, is one involving control of employee speech by a
governmental employer. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215-16 (citing Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
188. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). See also
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (striking
down a statute prohibiting certain depictions of animal cruelty for being a content-
based regulation did not pass strict scrutiny); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (establishing oft-repeated concept that there are "certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" that are not constitutionally
protected). The substantial protection given certain defamatory speech is, in effect,
an exception to an exception.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
190. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Actually, the Gertz
dicta stating that there is no "constitutional value" to false statements is contestable,
and it has not necessarily been consistently followed by the Court itself. See
generally David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment's
Protection of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70, 70-131 (2012) (providing
an excellent pr6cis of this general topic). If the dicta were in fact entirely true, then
its fullest force should presumably apply to the institution that the Constitution
constituted, namely, the government itself, and government untruthfulness should
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Third, although the Bartnicki Court suggested that the interest in
disclosing information of purely private concern, such as "gossip,"l91
might not overcome the privacy interests affected by such disclosure,
that was certainly not part of its holding in the case. On the contrary, the
Court expressly left the question open, just as it had done in the earlier
case of Time, Inc. v. Hill.192 The Court still has not decided a case with
facts that required the issue to be considered.
Finally, even if the "core purposes of the First Amendment"l 93
center on information of public concern, the Court has left no doubt that
freedom of expression is not solely "the preserve of political expression
or comment upon public affairs."1 9 4 There are good policy reasons why
communications about matters of non-public concern should also be
treated as protected speech. After all, most of the information that is most
important to most people does not relate to matters of public concern. To
be sure, people's lives are affected by what governments do, but ordinary
men and women are vastly more likely to be affected by the actions of
the ordinary people around them, the people with whom they live and
directly interact. The average person's interest in information about the
qualities, character, conduct, and propensities of her nearby neighbors is
accordingly be forbidden or, indeed, probably punishable. This, no doubt, cannot be
right. What is wrong with the Gertz proposition is not merely its impracticality (for
example, government as we know it could not function without lies). What is really
wrong is, at bottom, the very notion that false statements are necessarily bad. At any
rate, the Court drastically qualified the Gertz dicta last spring in the "Stolen Valor"
case, holding that laws punishing false statements must pass strict scrutiny in order
to be constitutionally valid. United States v. Alvarez, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012) (striking down a federal law that made it a crime to claim falsely to be a
recipient of military decorations or medals).
191. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
192. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
193. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533-34.
194. Time, 385 U.S. at 388 ("The guarantees for speech and press are not the
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those
are to healthy government."). See also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S.
, -, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) ("[W]e have long recognized that it is
difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try."); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("[C]ases have never suggested that
expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full First
Amendment protection.") (emphasis added).
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not only legitimate but, typically, the most relevant informational interest
of all. "'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period."'l 95 Any realistic theory of the First Amendment must
take into account the fact that a large part of the communication that
people consider important does not concern matters of wide public
interest but, rather, concerns the qualities, character, conduct and
propensities of other ordinary human beings.196
At any rate, while it may have seemed for a time that the Court
might demote information of non-public concern to an inferior
constitutional status,' 9 7 the Court in more recent years has recognized
explicitly that most of what we say to each other lacks serious value and,
yet, it is sheltered from government regulation. Even "'[w]holly neutral
futilities,"' the Court has pointedly said, "'come under the protection of
free speech as fully as do [John] Keats' poems or [John] Donne's
sermons. " The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits." 99 "Even if we can see in them
'nothing of any possible value to society, . . . they are as much entitled to
195. Time, 385 U.S. at 388 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940)).
196. Eoin Carolan makes the interesting argument that communications of
private information in individual chit-chat should actually have a preferred status
compared with disclosures in the media. Eoin Carolan, The Concept of a Right to
Privacy, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: A DOCTRINAL & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 28
(2008). A problem with this argument is that it is hard to distinguish what might be
meant by "media" in the era of highly distributed communication brought about by
the Internet. Moreover, the First Amendment values that can be achieved through
disclosing truthful information do not depend on who does the disclosing.
197. The plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-61 (1985), perhaps represents the high point of this
hierarchization of protected speech, but it was after all only a plurality and the
context of the case was defamation, which traditionally falls within a categorical
exclusion from First Amendment protection. But cf Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
,1 -, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (elevating the Dun & Bradstreet plurality
opinion to the status of "our opinion").
198. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cohen v. California, 430 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
199. Id. at 1585.
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the protection of free speech as the best of literature."'200 Therefore,
government cannot ban speech just because it "is deemed valueless or
unnecessary." 20 1
We may bemoan the fact that people find juicy gossip to have
such compelling interest, and there are surely good arguments as to why,
in general, our neighbors' private lives should be none of our business.
But free speech is not just a constitutional right of politically active elites
but of ordinary people as well. "Some . .. ideas and information are vital,
some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented.' 202 If "the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open,
governments must not be allowed to choose 'which issues are worth
discussing or debating."' 2 03 For ordinary people in their ordinary daily
lives, knowing about the activities, choices and, ultimately, the character
of those who live around them can have enormous personal consequence
for both their private and "public" decisions and, therefore, be a matter of
utmost concern, even if not a government-recognized "public"
concern.204 The Constitution simply does not permit laws that suppress
speech on particular topics on the theory that the "speech is not worth
,,205it.
It seems unlikely, in sum, that the Supreme Court will ever
actually hold that the First Amendment gives a lesser level of protection
to expressions of information that happen not to relate to a public
200. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2737 n.4 (2011) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)) (Winters
involved police-story magazines, and Brown involved videogames that depict violent
action scenarios).
201. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586. See also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972) (stating that the "government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
202. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ,, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72
(2011).
203. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-
38 (1980) (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96).
204. For a further thoughtful elaboration on arguments of this sort, see Volokh,
supra note 12, at 32-39. Professor Volokh suggests, plausibly, that information
about the lives and doings of the people immediately around us may be more
important than speech of public concern even in determining how most people vote.
See id.
205. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
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concern. Therefore, laws declaring such expressions illegal could not
bootstrap themselves to validity by making such expressions into
"speech integral to illegal conduct."
5. Summarizing the Exception for Speech Integral to Unlawful Conduct
The First Amendment does not restrain the state's power to
regulate speech that falls into one of the Amendment's categorical
exceptions, such as the exception for speech that is integral to unlawful
206
conduct. The First Amendment should, therefore, offer no impediment
to privacy laws that prohibit the acquisition or communication of private
information when it is done by resort to unlawful conduct or creates
incentives for such conduct. However-and this is a key caveat-
"crimes" or "torts" that themselves impinge unconstitutionally on First
Amendment interests cannot count as the predicate "unlawful conduct."
Thus, for example, a state might define a crime or tort of "unlawful
observation" and then try to use "unlawful observation" as a predicate
for restricting speech that discloses what has been observed. The
problem with this strategy is that the restriction on the individual's
fundamental right to "observe what he pleases"207 would itself be a
constitutionally invalid restriction. Because observation is a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution, laws that restrict it must presumably
satisfy one of the several standard bases for restricting First Amendment
freedoms.2 08
Similarly a legislature might enact a law that prohibits
observations made under certain circumstances, such as by the use of
digitally assisted memory devices, e.g., a ban on recording conversations
either covertly209 or without the consent of the persons being recorded.210
Some of these laws-e.g., laws that include an element prohibiting
206. See id. at 1584 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949)).
207. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565, 568 (1969) ("Because that right is
so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be
justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.").
208. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
209. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (b)-(c) (West 2010); supra note 16.
210. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001) (applying
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (2001)).
70 [Vol. 11I
fraudulent deception-might conceivably pass constitutional muster but,
on the whole, it seems unlikely that valid restrictions on the fundamental
right to observe would suffice to support broadly sweeping privacy
rights. This is especially so with respect to personal information that the
person claiming privacy has exposed to the plain view of others, in
public or otherwise.
In short, insofar as the right of privacy means a right not to be
observed or communicated about, it is simply too directly at odds with
First Amendment interests to be itself the subject of a valid legal right.
The best way to keep secrets is not to let them out in the first place.
V. PRIVACY PROTECTION INCIDENTAL TO SOME OTHER VALID PURPOSE
Under the "incidental burdens," or United States v. O'Brien2 1 1
rule, the First Amendment permits laws of general applicability to
impose incidental burdens on speech as long as the law is meant to serve
an important governmental interest unrelated to suppressing free
expression.212 As the Supreme Court has explained, "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."213 The incidental burdens rule provides a third possible basis
for upholding laws that impinge on free expression in the interest of
privacy. The seminal case is United States v. O'Brien,214 which upheld a
law prohibiting the destruction of government-issued draft cards despite
the fact that the destruction was done as a way to express a political
211
viewpoint.
211. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a ban on draft
card burning, even when it was done as a way of expressing a political viewpoint).
212. See id. at 377; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-
70 (1991) (cataloging many examples of how the press receives no particular
immunity from the law); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("It is clear
that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press
that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general
applicability.").
213. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
214. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
215. See id. at 383.
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When the government defends a law on the ground that it has
only incidental burdens on speech, the law is subject only to
"intermediate" scrutiny.2 16 Under this lesser level of scrutiny, the
government can justify a law restricting speech by showing show that: (i)
the law furthers an "important or substantial governmental interest," (ii)
the law is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," and (iii) the
incidental burden on First Amendment freedoms is "no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." 2 17
Because of the requirement that the law be "unrelated to
suppression of free expression," the incidental burdens rule could not
justify laws, such as privacy laws, whose very purpose is to restrict the
218kinds of information that persons may disseminate. Privacy laws
would fail this "unrelated to suppression" requirement of intermediate
scrutiny whenever they seek to achieve their purpose by banning the
expression of one or more classes of content (e.g., information about
private lives). By contrast, the traditional law of property provides
substantial protection to privacy interests while meeting all three of the
criteria of the O'Brien incidental burdens rule. Indeed, ordinary property
laws have played a large and continuing role in protecting the interest in
privacy.
216. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994)
("[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny.").
217. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. A closely related line of authorities upholds the
validity of laws that regulate the time, place or manner of expression. See, e.g., Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). In terms of the scrutiny employed, the
primary difference between "incidental burden" cases and the "time, place, or
manner" cases is that the latter do not require that the speech regulations in question
be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. What the time, place, or manner
exception requires instead is that the restrictions on expression "leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791
(quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
218. See supra note 146.
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A. Privacy and Property219
Even though the freestanding "right of privacy"220 is a
comparatively recent invention, the privacy interest has long received
strong legal protection in the places where most people spend most of
their time, namely, in privately-owned spaces. What is not accessible
cannot be observed, and property rights are the most ancient and basic
rights to restrict the accessibility of places and the people who are in
them. Indeed, in a large fraction of the situations in which unwelcome
observation would intrude on privacy interests, the acts required to make
221
the observations would be violations of ordinary property rights.
219. It should be stressed that no suggestion is made in the discussion here that
privacy protection can or should be accomplished by recognizing a new kind of
"ownership" rights that one has in information about oneself. See JULIUS C. S.
PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN
PERSONA 242 (1996). In this respect, along with Jane Baron, I agree such an
approach is neither practical nor, probably, desirable. See Jane B. Baron, Property as
Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L. REv. 367
(2012). Rather, the argument here is that ordinary property rights in land and
chattels, extended by ordinary contracting activity, confer a substantial measure of
the privacy protection that we are reasonably entitled to expect.
However, it should be noted in this regard that laws conferring persons with
property rights in information about themselves would not be entitled to treatment as
"incidental" burdens on speech because the governmental interest that they serve, if
any, cannot be said to be "unrelated to suppression of free expression." O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 377. On the contrary, laws enacted to prevent the dissemination of personal
information are designed for the very purpose of suppressing expression and,
therefore, they manifestly do not satisfy the "unrelated to suppression" requirement.
As Professor Volokh has aptly observed: "Calling a speech restriction a
'property right,' though, doesn't make it any less a speech restriction, and it doesn't
make it constitutionally permissible." Volokh, supra note 12, at 1063. Therefore, in
order for the O'Brien analysis to apply, the property right being protected by the law
in question must be something other than a putative "property right" not to be
observed or talked about, or some sort of "property right" not to have the
communication occur. Property rights in land and chattels clearly meet this criterion.
A freestanding "property right" to personal information about oneself would not. A
proprietization of persona is simply an indirect way of creating on restriction on First
Amendment interests. See Volokh, supra note 12, at 1062-76.
220. A "freestanding" right of privacy means one that is not derived from or
derivative from other torts or wrongs. See supra note 57.
221. For example, in most of the illustrations of protected privacy in § 652B
and § 652D of the Second Restatement of Torts, the invasion of privacy is
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Centuries before anyone ever thought of freestanding privacy rights,
ordinary property law was already serving effectively to exclude
intruding eyes and ears from the private spheres of life.
Not only have ordinary property rights long provided a large
measure of protection for privacy interests, it is also worth noting that
they are themselves protected in the Bill of Rights, just as First
122Amendment interests are. The primary focus of this constitutional
223protection is not economic but on the very aspect of property rights
224that is most relevant to privacy, namely, the right to exclude others. In
describing the constitutional protection of property, the Supreme Court
has stressed that "the right to exclude others" is "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property."225 While the right of free expression takes priority over
ordinary torts, such as "invasion of privacy," 22 6 First Amendment rights
do not necessarily trump a property right to exclude others.227 Both, after
all, are enumerated rights.
accomplished by invasion of a property right. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1977).
222. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Njor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."). This clause limits, as further explained
in the text immediately below, the extent to which government can authorize private
persons to invade or intrude upon the private spheres of others.
223. A primary issue in the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence is
determining precisely which economic interests are, and are not, property rights for
"only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them....
We cannot start the process of just-compensation] decision by calling such a claim .
. . a 'property right'; whether it is a property right is really the question to be
answered." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
224. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). The core meaning of "possession"
is defined as the intentional exclusion of others, and the right to possession enjoyed
by owners is, more importantly, the right to exclude.
225. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176. See also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
226. See supra Parts II-V.
227. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (regarding trespass);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (discussing how First Amendment rights
interact with trespass); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972)
("[T]his Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise
general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only."). Cf Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32;
Even apart from their status as enumerated rights, however,
property rights have another major constitutional advantage over
freestanding rights of privacy: Any burden that property rights might
impose on First Amendment interests would qualify as a mere
"incidental" burden under the O'Brien rule.228 Thus, whereas
freestanding "privacy" torts are, essentially, pure and simple
impingements on the fundamental rights to communicate and observe,229
the law of property exists primarily to serve interests that are utterly
unrelated to First Amendment concerns. They are a paradigmatic
example of laws "unrelated to the content of speech [which] are subject
to an intermediate level of scrutiny." 2 30 Because the burden that property
rights might impose on speech is only "incidental" to serving other valid
governmental interests, privacy protection rooted in property rights
should have no trouble passing constitutional muster.
The close connection between ordinary property rights and
privacy is sometimes overlooked, but it has long existed. It is not likely a
coincidence that actions in trespass, unlike most torts, do not require
proof of actual dollars-and-cents damages but can be maintained based
231
solely on the fact of intrusion alone. And, perhaps even more
significantly, the extensive protections given to property in the criminal
law neither make economic damage a precondition nor its absence a
defense. In short, the laws that protect property rights, civil and criminal,
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433. In Lloyd, the Court made clear that property rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not automatically bow to First Amendment
rights but, rather, that "accommodations between the values protected by these three
Amendments are sometimes necessary." Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567-68. See also Burson
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (explaining the conflict between assuring the
right to vote freely and First Amendment rights, forcing the Court "to reconcile our
commitment to free speech with our commitment to other constitutional rights.");
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (discussing the conflict between the right
to freedom of press and assuring the accused receives a fair trial).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 211-15.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
230. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
231. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 164 (Wis. 1977) (upholding
a $100,000 punitive damages award for a brief trespass that did no economic harm);
Merest v. Harvey, (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P) (discussing how awarding
punitive damages can remedy the claimant's harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 163 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 75-77 (5th student ed. 1984).
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are at least as much about preserving what we call "privacy" as they are
about the protection of wealth.
The connection between property and "seclusion" privacy
becomes readily apparent when we consider the kinds of places where
people are likely to have reasonable privacy expectations.232 First and
foremost, of course, privacy is expected in the home where, under
ordinary property principles, the owner's right of possession creates a
legal protection from outsiders that every resident enjoys. "Possession"
in its core meaning refers to a kind of conduct, specifically, the conduct
of exerting dominion and control over a place or thing by taking action to
exclude others from it.233 By merely engaging in the act of possession, a
person traditionally acquires a legal right to exclude others.234 Indeed,
even wrongful possessors have a right to be free from others'
235intrusions, even including intrusions by the actual owners who have
better "rights" to possession but who cannot simply invade possession by
236
self-help and must instead resort to proceedings at law. In the home,
the owner enjoys the exclusionary benefit of possession as a direct legal
right237 while others in the household enjoy privacy protection
232. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
233. The possession referred to in the text is "actual" possession, as
distinguished from constructive possession. An example of constructive possession
is the "possession" that an owner is deemed to have of unoccupied lands, so long as
the land is not in the possession of an adverse possessor. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Dew,
1 Stew. 229, 229-30 (Ala. 1827); RAY ANDREWS BROWN & WALTER B.
RAUSHENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.6, at 19-23 (3d ed. 1975).
234. See, e.g., Gillespie, I Stew. at 229-30; Dieterich Int'l. Truck Sales, Inc. v.
J.S. & J. Serv., Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Illinois & St. Louis
R.R. & Coal Co. v. Cobb, 94 Ill. 55, 57-60 (Ill. 1879) (involving trespass); Tapscott
v. Cobbs, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 172 (Va. 1854) (regarding ejectment); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., supra note 231, § 13, at 77-78 (5th ed. 1984); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 139, 160-64 (ABA Classics 2009) (1881). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158, 216 (1965) (stating that liability for
trespass lies when one person "enters land in the possession of the other"). Indeed,
technically, it is not "ownership" that confers the right to exclude others but, rather,
it is possession, actual or constructive, that confers the right-i.e., it is the possessor
that has the standing to bring and prevail in trespass and ejectment actions. Id.
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(1) (1965).
236. See Jordan v. Talbot, 361 P.2d 20, 24 (Cal. 1961). Apparently, the
original law adopting this rule was enacted in the year 1381. See id. at 23 n.2.
237. Owners generally hold a possessory estate in fee simple absolute;
possession may also be held under a leasehold estate, such as a term of years.
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238
derivatively, from the property rights of the owner. Similarly, in the
typical employment situation, employees at work derive substantial
privacy protection from the fact that their employers, as possessors of the
239
workplace, have the legal right to exclude others. By parity of
reasoning, there are also many other places where a person might, as a
practical matter, derive privacy protection from the property rights of
others-though usually on a more transitory basis. Obvious examples
include the restrooms at a movie theater and the fitting rooms in a
department store.
Admittedly, the analytical basis for this sort of "derivative"
protection for privacy is not well theorized in the cases.240 Theory or no,
however, people confidently assume that they enjoy privacy protection
wherever, under the circumstances, having an expectation of privacy
would be reasonable based upon the understandings that "society as a
whole possesses."241 And almost invariably, the crucial circumstance that
makes these privacy expectations reasonable is the fact that the place in
question has an owner who is exercising dominion and control in such a
242
way that reasonable expectations of privacy can arise.
238. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1965) (stating trespass
liability is to the owner and to "members of his household"). Derivative protection
can potentially apply in other areas as well, as described in the text immediately
following.
239. See supra note 234.
240. See, e.g., Pate v. Mun. Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)
(applying derivative privacy protection based on a trespass on another's premises);
Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Assocs., Civ.A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592 (Mass.
Super. May 26, 1999) (recognizing that the right to observe does not confer a right to
trespass).
241. To borrow wording from the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See supra note 62. Note, however, that the Fourth Amendment cases
do not necessarily protect privacy as extensively against government as the law of
property does against other persons. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91
(1998) (stating that merely being present in another's home with the owner's consent
does not necessarily confer a "legitimate expectation of privacy" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment). Probably, cases like Carter are best understood as examples of
situations in which owners can confer privacy protection as against other private
persons (by limiting the scope of the latters' licenses), but they are not permitted to
confer privacy protection as against government. See also Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924) (holding that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to
items found in open fields).
242. See supra note 219.
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Consider, for example, the situation where an owner of a
department store, as part of exercising dominion and control over the
store premises, undertakes to provide privacy to customers using the
store's fitting rooms. Under ordinary principles of contract or promissory
estoppel, such an undertaking (whether inferred from words, acts or the
circumstances) could afford a legal right to privacy protection not only
against the store's owner but also as against third persons. As against the
owner, the shopper's right to privacy can easily be understood as resting
on an ordinary contract "implied in fact."243 As against third persons the
privacy right can be understood as resting on the store owner's right to
exclude, which includes a legal power to grant licenses of limited scope
243. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.8(c)
(5th ed. 2003); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18 (One vol. ed.
1952). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 4 cmt. a, 19 cmt. a
(1981) ("Conduct may often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a
proposed promise."). To avoid issues of lack of consideration, the theory of
promissory estoppel could be invoked to support the implied agreement to provide
privacy. See PERILLO, § 6.3(a).
Incidentally, the law of contracts and promissory estoppel, like that of property,
provide another paradigmatic example of laws having general applicability that
impose only an "incidental" burden on First Amendment freedoms while furthering
other important governmental interests. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S.
663, 669-71 (1991). In any case, it is well established that the enforcement of
contract rights can impinge on free expression without running afoul of the First
Amendment. Id. at 671 ("The parties themselves determine the scope of their legal
obligations, and any restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful
information are self-imposed."). Just because the Constitution guarantees a right-
including the rights to speak and observe-does not mean that people cannot make
contracts about those rights. A consideration of the outer limits of this principle is
beyond the scope of this Article but an excellent discussion can be found in Volokh,
supra note 12, at 1057-63.
One final point: there is no reason why the state could not exact criminal
penalties for privacy invasions that are rooted in contract rights. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2008) (unlawful surveillance where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy). While breach of contract is not normally a crime,
there is certainly precedent for attaching criminal penalties to contract breaches that
are considered to be criminally blameworthy-for example, in the law of actus reus
where violating a contract duty can be a criminal "omission," discussed at greater
length in John A. Humbach, Criminal Prosecution for HMO Treatment Denial, 11
HEALTH MATRIX 147, 148 (2001). The main point in the text is, however, that even
without criminal penalties, an invasion of privacy could be a legal wrong under
ordinary rules of property and contract law.
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to visitors, customers, and other invitees.44 Department stores admit
shoppers under licenses of limited scope, and it is reasonable to infer that
one of the limitations on those licenses is that shoppers are not permitted
to enter or make "observations" into fitting rooms being used by other
shoppers.24 5 If someone in the store exceeds the scope of this limited
license by, for example, peeping into an occupied fitting room, that act
246
would be a trespass under the law ordinarily applicable to property
and, it seems reasonable to infer, a breach of a third-party beneficiary
247
contract, implied in fact, for the benefit of the other shoppers. That is
to say, given the conventions of our times, it seems perfectly reasonable
to say that every customer coming into a department store impliedly
agrees not to intrude or "observe" in the fitting rooms occupied by
others, and that all of the store's patrons are meant to be the beneficiaries
of this understanding. Under ordinary applications of property law and
complementary applications of contract law, the shoppers who come in
the store thus derive legal rights of privacy from the owner who, based
on the owner's property right to exclude others, is in a legal position to
confer such privacy.
Similar reasoning can apply to protect privacy interests in private
information except that, in the case of information, the basis for the
protection would more normally be personal property law-primarily,
the law with regard to chattels. The law of personal property provides a
fertile source of controls that can be used in protecting information
244. In property law, a "license" is generally understood to be a revocable
privilege for freedom to make certain limited use of land that is in the licensor's
possession (dominion and control). 2 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 8.110 (A. James Casner ed. 1952). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167 cmt. a-h, 168 (1965). Because the land is by definition
in the possession of another, the uses permitted by the license would, in the absence
of the license, be trespasses. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 50 (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., 1964).
245. All of this understanding is normally tacit, of course-being implicit in
the widely accepted conventions applicable to situation of that same general kind,
much like contracts implied in fact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892
cmt. c (1979); see also PERILLO, supra note 243.
246. See Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167 cmt. a-h, 168 (1965).
247. See PERILLO, supra note 243, § 17.3, 665-67; CORBIN, supra note 243, §
776.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
privacy inasmuch as all information, except our memories, is embodied
in physical objects (e.g., paper, digital equipment, or other recording
media) which usually have owners. The owners of these information-
bearing physical media have, by virtue of their ownership, rights to
exclude others from the media themselves and they are, therefore, legally
entitled to deny other people access to the information embodied in
them.248 In addition to the owners of the physical media, there also may
be owners of the information itself (i.e., of the intellectual property);
these owners may also have rights to control access to and use of the
media (e.g., copying the information in it or playing it publicly).24 9
Violations of privacy by unauthorized access to others' physical media or
the information embodied in it constitute property torts which, quite
apart from any possible freestanding rights of privacy, provide a legal
250basis for privacy protection. And, most importantly for constitutional
purposes, the burden on First Amendment interests occasioned by
redressing these property-type torts would easily be considered only
"incidental" to an important governmental purpose unrelated to
expression (viz., the interest in protecting private property), and it should
therefore easily pass "intermediate scrutiny" under the O'Brien rule.251
The "information privacy" interest in data-bearing chattels is, of
course, entitled to receive its property law protection irrespective of
where the chattels happen to be located-be it in a public place or on
248. Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066-67 (N.D. Cal.
2000). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). Unlike the tort of
trespass to land, the tort of trespass to chattels does not allow for recoveries of
merely nominal damages: "The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability,
unlike the similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an
action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order
that an actor who interferes with another's chattel may be liable, his conduct must
affect some other and more important interest of the possessor." Id. § 218 cmt. e. As
indicated by the Ebay case, however, intermeddlings with chattels that appropriate
information embodied in them are not harmless. See Ebay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-
67.
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. d-e (1965). See also 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006).
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217 cmt. d-e, 218, 218 cmt. b
("It is normally immaterial that the person in possession is not entitled to retain
possession as against some third person, or that he has obtained his possession
wrongfully.").
251. See supra text accompanying notes 211-18.
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252
privately-owned real property. A person does not lose her property
right to exclude others from her purse, diary, or electronic media just
because she takes them into the public square or on the premises owned
by others. Property rights in chattels have long sufficed to protect privacy
in information contained in media as long as the person seeking the
privacy protection owns or contractually controls the media in question.
Concededly, a person's right to protect private information in
physical media depends in part on maintaining careful control of the
213information in the first place. Trying to control private information
after it has been embodied in media owned by others can be decidedly
problematic. The Supreme Court has said for example that, under the
Fourth Amendment, bank customers cannot generally claim a
"reasonable" expectation of privacy in the information that they turn over
254
to their banks. One can, of course, debate whether the Court was
empirically correct in its factual surmise that privacy expectations are not
"reasonable" in that situation (and the Court's holding has by now been
so long in place that it may have become a self-fulfilling prophesy). Even
so, however, the rule for banks should not necessarily apply in special
situations such as those of, say, lawyers who are ethically bound to
observe duties of confidentiality. And, perhaps, the lawyer analogy
may be extendible to other situations where, by statute26 or contract, the
owners of physical media that embody others' private information have
252. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (stating that what
a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected"). Of course, the person must have a right or privilege
to keep the particulars private-a person cannot, absent some very special facts,
claim a right of privacy in the contents of another person's purse. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 216 (1965). But a property right in chattels that contain or
embody private information confers the requisite right. See id. § 217.
253. See, e.g., Emil Protalinski, Online Identity Theft Up 200% Since 2010,
ZDNET (Jul. 19, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/online-identity-theft-up-200-since-
2010-7000001170/.
254. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)) ("The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.").
255. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
256. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 160.103, 164.500, 164.502 (2011), under
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 enacted as a part of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. Law 104191 (1996).
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bound themselves to use their dominion and control in ways that
257
maintain the secrets entrusted to them. For present purposes, however,
only a limited point need be made: whatever privacy protection a person
has in information embodied in physical media, the exclusivity rights
held by the media owner play a crucial role. Owners of information-
bearing media have rights, as a matter of property law, not to have their
258
computers hacked, their files rifled, or communication lines tapped.
And in the absence of these property rights, it is hard to conceive how
the protection of information privacy could be practically effective even
with freestanding privacy rights.
In summary, it appears that most reasonable expectations of
privacy, both in seclusion and information, enjoy protection as a normal
consequence of long-established property rights to exclude. To the extent
that people would have to commit property torts in order to intrude on
seclusion or obtain private information, there is already legal protection
against such wrongs. One reason this legal protection is important is that
it does not exist as a result of direct bans on the creation and free flow of
information but is, instead, a mere "incidental" impact of the right to
exclude that is the essence of ownership, of both places and media. The
property rights on which such protection is based enjoy, moreover, the
status of enumerated constitutional rights. Thus, rather than trying to
justify the freestanding privacy tort expressed as the direct antithesis of
rights to express and observe, many or most reasonable privacy
expectations can be protected as simply the normal consequences of the
long-established property right to exclude.
257. Note that, in this regard, personal information provided to the government
presents a special case. When government elicits or collects information either by
coercing disclosure or by requiring it as a condition to obtaining government-
monopolized services (such as a driver's license), there may be legitimate
constitutional grounds for protecting the private information in the hands of the
government or its transferees. See Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Information
Privacy by Assumption, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 953, 969 (2012). The absence of a
constitutional right of information privacy against private persons does not mean that
there is not such a right as against government. Id.
258. See supra note 252. For an example of a criminal law protecting the
property right, see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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B. Property and the Reasonableness ofPrivacy Expectations
The exclusivity that is provided by ordinary property rights
provides substantial protection for privacy in the places where most
people spend most of their time, viz. privately owned spaces, and in the
objects that hold most of our personal information, including papers,
digital equipment, and other such privately-owned chattels.259 But what
about protecting privacy in places where property exclusivity (direct or
derivative) would not apply; for example, in public or semi-public places
or on premises where the owner does not expressly or impliedly
undertake to provide or allow privacy to persons who are present there?
Does relying on property laws to protect privacy leave out important
protection? Probably not. Where the shelter of property rights is absent,
it is not likely that a person could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy anyway.
Suppose, for example, someone is invited into a home or other
premises and decides to establish, without the owner's approval, a
secluded enclave or place of solitude of the sort that is seemingly
contemplated by the Second Restatement of Torts, claiming a right to be
free of the owner's prying eyes and ears.260 To expect privacy in such a
situation would be tantamount to expecting an entitlement to deprive
261
another person of her property right. Such an expectation of privacy is,
of course, imaginable but, without a radical revision of the ordinary
social and legal expectations associated with ownership, it could hardly
be considered reasonable. Any law purporting to grant privacy rights
based on such unilateral assertions of control of other persons' premises,
i.e., to forbid a possessor of premises from observing an intruder or
invitee, or from approaching a unilaterally established place of seclusion,
262
would be at the expense of the basic right of dominion and control.
Indeed, depending on the details, a state's attempt to create such non-
property based privacy rights without compensating owners may even be
constitutionally forbidden.263
259. See supra Part V.A.
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
261. Cf supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
263. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation"). See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
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Similarly, one cannot very well go into a public square and
credibly claim a right to be unobserved.264 To recognize such a right of
privacy would be in direct derogation of the rights of others to look
around themselves and see their surroundings in public places. Unless
the public owner of the public space authorizes unilateral assertions of
control by individuals on their own initiative (for example, permissions
to camp in a national forest), such impingements on the rights of others
would be hard to regard as "reasonable."
This does not mean, of course, that enforceable privacy rights
cannot exist in public areas or on premises belonging to others. On the
contrary, the ownership of chattels confers property rights that protect
privacy, especially information privacy, no matter where the chattels are
located. As already noted, just because a person brings her purse into
another's home or a public place, it does not follow that others are
entitled to rifle through it.265 As a matter of both law and social
expectations, the right to keep other people off your chattels or person266
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1982) (taking away the right to exclude is
compensable). A permanent physical intrusion is a per se taking, and a temporary
occupation may be. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 317-18 (1987); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,
338 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1949). See generally my earlier discussion in John A. Humbach,
A Unifying Theory for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and
Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 262-67 (1982).
264. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-352 (1967) ("What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.").
265. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). The Restatement
defines trespass to chattels as "using or intermeddling with a chattel in the
possession of another" as well as dispossessing another. Id. Presumably, wrongful
access for the purpose of invading information privacy would best be understood in
Restatement terms as "dispossession," i.e., taking the chattel from the other's
possession. Id. §§ 216, 221(a). Under the Restatement, one who "dispossesses"
another of a chattel is liable for trespass. Id. § 218. See also Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066-67 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
266. As, for example, the pockets in your clothing. Cf Rico v. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1099 (Cal. 2007) (holding that an attorney who
discovered privileged work product could examine it long enough to determine it
was privileged).
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is not lost just because you enter into another person's proprietary
267
space.
The fundamental point is, however, that the existence of ordinary
property rights and reasonable expectations of privacy are typically
closely interrelated. It is rare to find the latter without the support of the
former. What is more, there seems historically to have been little direct
legal impingement on the general right to observe others in their private
lives or activities other than in situations where property rights are also
implicated.268 The comments and illustrations under Restatement of Torts
§ 652B contain only one example of actionable intrusion on privacy that
cannot be understood as flowing directly or derivatively from ordinary
property rights.269 Among the few circumstances in which the law has
made mere observation a criminal act, the fact that the aggrieved party
has a right to privacy in the first place seems to be pre-supposed. A
267. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). The
landowner can, of course, stipulate that a visitor consent to a search as a condition to
entering on the land, and a person who refuses to submit can be legally obliged to
leave. But absent such consent, there would be no right to conduct a search-at least
not in the case of non-governmental actors. Id.
268. See supra note 90.
* 269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2 (1977)
(using binoculars or telescopic gear to peer into another's upstairs window and take
photographs).
One privacy interest not covered by property protection in any obvious way is
the interest in preserving personal modesty from people who attempt to peer under
clothing or take pictures of sexual or other intimate areas. This reprehensible
practice is apparently such a widespread problem that specific legislation has been
enacted making it a felony. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45(4) (McKinney
2008). The privacy interest in question does not, however, easily fit within any
theory of property protection. This is because it is possible to view under another
person's clothing without ever touching it, and it would be an unprecedented, albeit
not illogical, extension of property law to make a it trespass merely to defeat the use
of a chattel (clothing) without actually interfering with it. There is also, however, the
thorny question of reasonable expectation of privacy. Suppose, for example, a man
goes around town with his fly open. Does such an individual have a reasonable
expectation of privacy? Perhaps, it is not too much to expect people to be
responsible for maintaining their own personal modesty.
Of course, machines capable of looking under people's clothing are another
matter but, at the time of the writing, it is mostly only the government that is known
to be operating such machines. See, e.g., Anahad O'Connor, Airports Start Body
Scans Next Month, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at Al 5.
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"Peeping Tom" law, for example, might make it a crime to "peep
secretly into a room occupied by a female person . .. 270 But it seems to
be presupposed that the person observed already had an independent
entitlement to privacy in the room-that is to say, presumably, no one
thinks that the law would apply against those who might look if a
"female person" were to decide to disrobe in the main cabin of an airliner
in flight. 2 7 1 Micturition in a place open to public view is the crime of the
one who does it, not the ones who see it.272 To observe such acts in
public does not make one a "Peeping Tom."
In sum, it seems that little is left out by rooting privacy
protection in property law because, in order for there to be reasonable
expectations of privacy, there needs to be a lawful basis to exert control
over the locations or things in question and, by extension, over the eyes
and ears of the persons lawfully there. Stated the other way, people who
choose to engage in "private" activities in places open to the observation
of others lawfully present do not likely have reasonable claims to control
those others and, therefore, do not have a right not to be observed.273 It is
rare at any rate to find actual rights of privacy in which the right to
exclude others' eyes and ears cannot be understood as predicated, either
directly or derivatively, on property.
C. Isn't Privacy About People, Not Property?
Admittedly, rooting privacy rights primarily in property law is
something that some may find unsatisfying. It may seem to get things
270. In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (N.C. 1978) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-202).
271. See Woman Strips Naked On Delta Flight, HUFFPOST TRAVEL (May 9,
2011, 6:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/09/woman-strips-naked-
on-del n_859689.html.
272. People v. Legel, 321 N.E.2d 164, 168 (111. App. Ct. 1974) ("[A] room in
one's own home may be a public place under certain circumstances" and "[t]he duty
lies with the deviate to keep his activities private.").
273. Cf California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) ("[Pllastic garbage
bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to . .. other
members of the public."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13
(1973) (giving the example of "marital intercourse on a street corner").
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upside down, elevating laws that protect property over those that protect
274
persons.
In part, this feeling may stem from the idea that property rights
are economic rights while privacy rights are about persons. But that idea
itself rests on a basic misconception. Although property rights do protect
271
economic interests, that is certainly not their only role. On the
contrary, in their normal operation and, perhaps, in their greatest
importance to most people, property rights protect the important interest
in having places to seek seclusion, places to get away from others, and a
"retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the
tribulations of their daily pursuits."276 So to assume that property rights
are solely for the protection of economic interests is to misunderstand the
277
aims and purposes of property law. Trespass to land is, as already
pointed out, one of the rare torts that does not require economic injury as
a part of the cause of action.278 Beyond that, most property owners today
are homeowners and, while homeowners surely appreciate the economic
significance of their property, it is unlikely that most of them see their
home as mainly an economic commodity. Indeed, in the human psyche
279
the economic value of "home" probably is the least of its significances.
274. Actually, I would not have thought this section necessary, but it is written
to address the frank outrage that was, quite to my surprise, directed toward the
property theory by "privacy rights" supporters at the international forum on privacy
organized by Professor Russell Weaver (Louisville) at the Johannes Gutenberg
University in Mainz, held on June 23-24, 2011. See Humbach, supra note 70. For
some, apparently, using property exclusivity to protect privacy exclusivity does not
seem at all to be a natural fit.
275. See supra note 227. See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
276. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471
(1980)).
277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965); supra note 226
and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
279. Of course, for many people home is a place that is rented, and renters are
not conventionally thought of as owners. In legal contemplation, however, renters
are "owners," holding ownership of an estate-and nearly absolute right to
exclude-that differs only in duration from the estates held by those who own in fee
simple. For renters, home does not have the economic significance that it has for
owners in fee simple, but it is, as much as for anybody, "the last citadel of the tired,
the weary, and the sick . . . the one retreat to which men and women can repair to
escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits . . . ." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
One possible reason why the non-economic (or "privacy") value
of property is under-appreciated is that intrusions on the owner's privacy
interest, on her right to exclude purely for exclusion's sake, are nearly
always handled as criminal matters. The property foundation of crimes
280like unlawful entry, burglary and other trespass is more or less implicit
in penal statutes--essentially, it is taken for granted. In the case of such
crimes, moreover, economics may be hardly a consideration at all. When
someone calls the police to stop a purse-snatcher or to remove an
intruder from her home, the situation is not normally thought of as an
economic dispute. In dealing with such "property" crimes, courts rarely
refer to the economics of the situation but focus their concern on the
often highly personal underlying exclusivity interest that they are
protecting-the "right to be left alone." 281
Indeed, if property rights served only an economic function, the
law would not need to attach anything like the thoroughgoing exclusivity
to them that it in fact does. One need only consider, by contrast, the far
less exclusivist interpretation of property rights that is given in parts of
282Europe. Under the allemansratt in Sweden, for instance, landowners
are generally required to permit the public to walk freely on their land
provided, among other things, that such access is not inconsistent with
the uses being made. Most owners of property in the United States would
find such an accommodation of others' freedom of motion to be very
uncomfortable, even though it preserves the economic value of the
property in question. But the right to privacy that the allemansrdtt
curtails is a crucial component of our conception of ownership, both in
the United States and widely elsewhere. It is not for nothing that we call
it "private" property.
280. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.00, 140.05, 140.20, 140.30 (McKinney
2010).
281. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
282. See generally Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private Land
for Walking: Environmental and Individual Responsibility as Rationale for Limiting
the Right to Exclude, 23 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 211, 215-32 (2011).
Allemansrdtt literally means "everyman's right." Id. at 215.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Nobody likes to be talked about, but everybody likes to talk.
Trying to stop the dissemination of private information is, however, an
impingement on free expression and the freedom to observe. A
freestanding "right of privacy" that violates these interests is
constitutionally permissible only if it can be justified using one of the
standard bases for allowing restrictions on First Amendment rights. The
three most likely possibilities are that the law in question: (1) can pass
strict scrutiny, (2) falls within a recognized "categorical" exception, or
(3) has only an "incidental" burden on First Amendment interests. Of
these three, only the last would seem to support a broad protection for
privacy in the face of a First Amendment challenge.
